DEFENDING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THE POST-TRUTH AGE: A ROADMAP TO A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH by Mason, Katelyn M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2020-09
DEFENDING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THE
POST-TRUTH AGE: A ROADMAP TO A
WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH
Mason, Katelyn M.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/66105
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.








DEFENDING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
IN THE POST-TRUTH AGE: A ROADMAP TO A 
WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH 
by 
Katelyn M. Mason 
September 2020 
Co-Advisors: Christopher Bellavita (contractor) 
 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 September 2020  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master's thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
DEFENDING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THE POST-TRUTH AGE: 
A ROADMAP TO A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Katelyn M. Mason 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 False narratives increasingly threaten U.S. democratic society and evolving adversaries and technology 
are making it more difficult for authorities and the public to differentiate between fact, opinion, and 
falsehoods. Despite experts proposing a variety of recommendations to mitigate this threat, the United States 
does not have a national-level strategy in place to combat deceptive messaging in a comprehensive and 
coordinated manner. The author analyzed over 170 recommendations for a U.S. strategy and found that 
many of them hinge on broad coordination between all U.S. stakeholders, which includes, but is not limited 
to, all levels of government, private sector, academia, media, and civil society. To identify how the United 
States can achieve the coordination needed to combat deceptive messaging, the author conducted a case 
study of the role of coordination in the European Union (EU) response to disinformation and an assessment 
of collective impact, a cross-sector coordination method used for complex social problems, for use in the 
United States. The conclusions of the case study and assessment endorse U.S. government practitioners to 
use collective impact and components of existing practices in the EU response to disinformation to build a 
coordinated national strategy to challenge those who wish to harm American democracy and U.S. interests 
via cyber-based deceptive messaging. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
disinformation, deceptive messaging, post-truth, falsehoods, coordination, collective impact, 
foreign influence, government strategy, fake news, propaganda, whole-of-society, deepfake,  
European Union, EU 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 129 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
DEFENDING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THE POST-TRUTH AGE: 
A ROADMAP TO A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH 
Katelyn M. Mason 
Lead Intelligence Analyst, Northern California Regional Intelligence Center 
B, Tiffin University, 2013 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
September 2020 
Approved by: Christopher Bellavita 
 Co-Advisor 
 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez 
 Co-Advisor 
 Erik J. Dahl 
 Associate Professor, Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 False narratives increasingly threaten U.S. democratic society and evolving 
adversaries and technology are making it more difficult for authorities and the public to 
differentiate between fact, opinion, and falsehoods. Despite experts proposing a variety of 
recommendations to mitigate this threat, the United States does not have a national-level 
strategy in place to combat deceptive messaging in a comprehensive and coordinated 
manner. The author analyzed over 170 recommendations for a U.S. strategy and found 
that many of them hinge on broad coordination between all U.S. stakeholders, which 
includes, but is not limited to, all levels of government, private sector, academia, media, 
and civil society. To identify how the United States can achieve the coordination needed 
to combat deceptive messaging, the author conducted a case study of the role of 
coordination in the European Union (EU) response to disinformation and an assessment 
of collective impact, a cross-sector coordination method used for complex social 
problems, for use in the United States. The conclusions of the case study and assessment 
endorse U.S. government practitioners to use collective impact and components of 
existing practices in the EU response to disinformation to build a coordinated national 
strategy to challenge those who wish to harm American democracy and U.S. interests via 
cyber-based deceptive messaging. 
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The use of deception and propaganda is weaved throughout human history and war, 
yet in recent years, these manipulative actions have become a renewed concern for national 
security efforts around the world.1 Falsehoods that travel through cyber-based platforms 
can exponentially reach more people in less time and can manifest into dangerous physical-
world outcomes. Cyber-based falsehoods have inflamed societal tensions, stimulated 
escalations to violence, affected economies and business, breached election security, 
misallocated resources during terror attacks or natural disasters, contributed to a rise in 
deadly but preventable diseases, and facilitated major geopolitical objectives.2 
Furthermore, adversaries and technology are evolving, which makes it more difficult for 
authorities and the public to differentiate between fact, opinion, and falsehoods.  
While many notable deceptive messaging campaigns can be attributed to Russian-
backed sources, other state and non-state actors with geopolitical, ideological, political, 
monetary, or notoriety-driven motivations increasingly use this tactic.3 In comparison to 
the extensive and growing threat, efforts in the United States to combat deceptive 
                                                 
1 Char Sample, Connie Justice, and Emily Darraj, “A Model for Evaluating Fake News” (paper 
presented at the CyCon U.S. 2018, Washington, DC, November 14–15, 2018), 1–2, 
https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/CyConUS18%20Conference%20Papers/
Session4-Paper1.pdf?ver=2018-11-13-160900-603. 
2 Samantha M. Korta, “Fake News, Conspiracy Theories, and Lies: An Information Laundering Model 
for Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 1–10, http://hdl.handle.net/
10945/58322; Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” 
Science 359, no. 6380 (March 9, 2018): 1146–1151, http://www.sciencemag.org/lookup/doi/10.1126/
science.aap9559; Gjorgji Veljovski, Nenad Taneski, and Metodija Dojchinovski, “The Danger of ‘Hybrid 
Warfare’ from a Sophisticated Adversary: The Russian ‘Hybridity’ in the Ukrainian Conflict,” Defense & 
Security Analysis 33, no. 4 (2017): 292–307, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2017.1377883. 
3 Christina Nemr and William Gangware, Weapons of Mass Distraction: Foreign State-Sponsored 




messaging are disproportionate and insufficient.4 To improve societal resilience in 
America scholars and practitioners have developed a broad spectrum of strategies that the 
U.S. government could use to mitigate the threat; however, many have yet to be adopted 
and implemented. To improve response efforts, this research answers the following 
question: Which defensive strategies should the United States prioritize to mitigate the 
impact of deceptive messaging, and how can government leaders implement them? 
To answer the research question, I collected a sample of 170 deceptive messaging 
related recommendations from a variety of subject matter experts. This study primarily 
focuses on defensive measures to help close the vulnerabilities of U.S. society, rather than 
strategies that aim to target, censor, or counter influence audiences. Using thematic 
analysis, the recommendations were categorized into five themes: (1) public resilience, (2) 
policy and regulation, (3) coordination, (4) research and development, and (5) operational 
activities. Out of the five themes, a majority of the recommendations primarily fell under 
two categories, (1) public resilience, and (2) coordination. Upon further exploration of the 
recommendations within public resilience and coordination, it was clear that many of the 
recommendations within other categories relied on close collaboration with stakeholders 
from a variety of disciplines, often referred to as a whole-of-nation or whole-of-society 
                                                 
4 Daniel Coats, 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018), 4–27, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf; Daniel Coats, 2019 Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2019), 5–7, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf; 
Samantha Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized 
Social Media Manipulation (Oxford, UK: Oxford Internet Institute’s Computational Propaganda Research 
Project, 2018), 5, http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2018/07/ct2018.pdf; Homeland 
Security Advisory Council, Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee, Homeland Security Advisory 
Council Countering Interim Report of the Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 10, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ope/
hsac/19_0521_final-interim-report-of-countering-foreign-influence-subcommittee.pdf. 
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approach.5 The importance of coordination influenced the rest of this research to focus on 
identifying methods that U.S. government leaders can use to create a whole-of-society 
approach to mitigate deceptive messaging through a case study of the European Union 
(EU) response to disinformation and an assessment of collective impact, a cross-sector 
coordination method often used for complex social problems. 
A review of the literature revealed two themes that present a hindrance to the 
coordination needed for a whole-of-society approach in the United States, the lack of a 
common understanding of the complex, ambiguous, and evolving nature of the threat, and 
a lack of clearly defined responsibilities and leadership among the stakeholders that could 
or should play a role in responding to the threat. To help simplify the terminology used to 
describe the threat, I use the term deceptive messaging in this thesis as a comprehensive 
phrase to capture the types of information used throughout the literature to define the threat. 
Despite the complexity, ambiguity, and lack of the leadership, the consensus across experts 
for a government-led multi-stakeholder approach has grown in popularity in dominant 
literature.6 The growing support among scholars for the government to take a leadership 
role and the documented tasking of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
become the leading entity to establish a national strategy to counter foreign influence and 
                                                 
5 Rand Waltzman, The Weaponization of Information: The Need for Cognitive Security, CT-473 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 4–5, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT473.html; Jamie Fly, 
Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian Interference in 
Democracies (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2018), 17–22, 
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/asd-policy-blueprint-countering-authoritarian-interference-
democracies; Mark Warner, “A New Doctrine for Cyberwarfare & Information Operations” (speech, 
Center for a New American Security, December 7, 2019), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/2018/12/warner-calls-for-society. 
6 Dipayan Ghosh and Ben Scott, #DigitalDeceit: The Technologies behind Precision Propaganda on 
the Internet (Washington, DC: New America, 2018), 4, https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/
digital-deceit-final-v3.pdf; Daniel Fried and Alina Polyakova, Democratic Defense against Disinformation 
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018), 10–14, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/
Democratic_Defense_Against_Disinformation_FINAL.pdf; Sijbren de Jong et al., Inside the Kremlin 
House of Mirrors: How Liberal Democracies Can Counter Russian Disinformation and Societal 
Interference (The Hague, Netherlands: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017), 2, https://hcss.nl/
report/inside-kremlin-house-mirrors-how-liberal-democracies-can-counter-russian-disinformation-0.  
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ensure effective coordination are promising steps toward overcoming the obstacles to 
building a collective response to deceptive messaging.7  
In addition to these positive steps, the U.S. government can leverage the strengths 
and weaknesses of existing disinformation response efforts around the world to accelerate 
progress. The case study of the EU’s fight against disinformation identified many 
coordination strategies the United States can leverage, such as the East StratCom Task 
Force, the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, and the Rapid Alert System.8 Other 
smart practices from the EU response to disinformation included the top-down driven 
strategy development, the availability and accessibility of information about the threat and 
response efforts, and the emphasis on citizen engagement.9 The EU case study provides 
valuable insight into building effective cross-sector coordination in its response to 
disinformation; however, it does not explicitly identify the steps that must be taken to build 
a connected network of stakeholders with a variety of missions, budgets, goals, and 
expectations. 
Collective impact is one method, with proven success, that can serve as a roadmap 
for the U.S. government to build a whole-of-society approach to combat deceptive 
messaging. Collective impact initiatives are defined as, “long-term commitments by a 
group of important actors from different sectors to a common agenda for solving a specific 
social problem.”10 Initiatives are structured around five conditions: (1) common agenda, 
                                                 
7 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee, Homeland 
Security Advisory Council Countering Interim Report of the Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee, 
10. 
8 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Report on 
the Implementation of the Action Plan against Disinformation (Brussels: European Commission, 2019), 1–
10, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_disinformation.pdf; European Union External 
Action, Rapid Alert System Strengthening Coordinated and Joint Responses to Disinformation (Brussels: 
European Union External Action, 2019), 1, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/
ras_factsheet_march_2019_0.pdf. 
9 European Commission, Joint Communication...Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan 
against Disinformation. 
10 John Kania and Mark Kramer, “Collective Impact,” Stanford Social Innovation Review 9, no. 1 
(Winter 2011): 39, https://ssir.org/articles/entry/collective_impact. 
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(2) shared measurement, (3) mutually reinforcing activities, (4) continuous 
communication, and (5) backbone support, all of which are aimed to align the efforts and 
maximize the resources of a diverse group of stakeholders.11 Such initiatives have been 
well studied and practitioners can leverage the abundance of resources and tools, such as 
the five phases of collective impact, public policies that encourage collective impact, and 
the collective impact feasibility framework, which provide specific action items and key 
milestones to foster successful initiatives.12 Based on the alignment with coordination 
needs, the expected outcome of an assessment using the feasibility framework, the 
measurable success in many cases and noticeable traces of elements in the EU response to 
disinformation, collective impact is a method that should be strongly considered for 
adoption in the United States. 
A national strategy to combat deceptive messaging must establish robust 
coordination across sectors as a priority, and once an entity is charged with the 
responsibility to lead this effort, practitioners can assess the collective impact method for 
use, and employ smart practices from the EU response to disinformation to accelerate 
progress toward achieving the level of coordination needed. Establishing effective 
coordination and domain awareness is just the first step in building a comprehensive 
national strategy to mitigate deceptive messaging in the United States. In addition to 
identifying and convening relevant government and non-government stakeholders, 
additional research is needed on the other types of expert recommendations identified in 
this thesis (public resilience, policy and regulation, research and development, and 
operational activities), media literacy training for all government employees to detect and 
verify information, strategic communication and information marketing, and existing 
                                                 
11 Kania and Kramer, “Collective Impact,” 41. 
12 Tamarack Institute, Collective Impact Self-Assessment and Planning Tool (Waterloo, ON: 
Tamarack Institute, 2017), 1–12, https://www.tamarackcommunity.ca/hubfs/Collective%20Impact/Tools/
CI%20Self%20Assessment%20Tool.pdf?hsCtaTracking=8df74891-21af-4a7c-88d7-
bb024f0d7d62%7C90f5999e-f7d9-4112-890e-96ed8a56a460; Thaddeus Ferber and Erin White, “Making 
Public Policy Collective Impact Friendly,” Stanford Innovation Review 12, no. 4 (Fall 2014): 23, 
https://ssir.org/pdf/Fall_2014_Making_Public_Policy_Collective_Impact_Friendly.pdf; FSG, Collective 
Impact Feasibility Framework (Boston: FSG, 2015), 3, https://www.collectiveimpactforum.org/sites/
default/files/Collective%20Impact%20Feasibility%20Framework.pdf.  
xx 
practices, systems, and knowledge, such as the National Network of Fusion Centers and 
the DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), which can possibly be 
leveraged to use for combatting deceptive messaging in America. 
Deceptive messaging campaigns are only expected to become more pervasive and 
more difficult to detect, track, and attribute with the adversary adapting to countermeasures 
and policies, and the evolution of technology, such as deepfakes and encryption. The lack 
of visibility or inability to identify deceptive messaging will make information sharing, 
collaboration, and public engagement even more important. Should the U.S. government 
not take the necessary steps to bring together important parts of society to challenge those 
who wish to harm the United States via cyber-based deceptive messaging, it may be on a 
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PROLOGUE: FAKE NEWS-INDUCED NUCLEAR WAR 
Citizens of the world live at a time when government and world leaders can and 
often communicate with each other and constituents quickly through the internet. This 
societal trend bears many great benefits, but also significant dangers. The average person 
“with relatively modest amounts of data and computing power” can create videos of anyone 
saying anything.13 Potential victims of such manipulation include a local police chief, a 
city mayor, a state’s governor, military personnel, a medical professional, all the way up 
to the President and Commander in Chief. The ability for someone to manipulate the words 
of individuals of power has the potential to create a catastrophe that would be difficult to 
prevent or reverse. 
The internet ecosystem allows users to create and share information rapidly and 
anonymously regardless of the quality or accuracy. Imagine a video of your local police 
chief making derogatory or racist remarks, that were never actually made, being posted 
online, and the resulting public outcry and damage to the community’s trust that would 
ensue. This example is just one hypothetical scenario, and the narratives that can be created 
from manipulating information are practically endless. Research has shown that counter 
messaging with the correct information is not exactly an effective method to reverse 
disinformation because of humans’ natural tendency not to change their minds with the 
introduction of new or different information.14 Public trust in government is fragile, and 
once a disinformation campaign goes viral, it can manifest as real physical threats to society 
that cannot be stopped.  
The physical threats that can manifest from online disinformation campaigns can 
be, and have been, as significant as bringing two nations to the brink of nuclear war. In 
2016, an online news story reported that the Israeli defense minister threatened Pakistan 
                                                 
13 Shruti Agarwal et al., “Protecting World Leaders Against Deep Fakes,” in Proceedings of the IEEE 
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) Workshops (June 2019): 38–45, 
https://farid.berkeley.edu/downloads/publications/cvpr19/cvpr19a.pdf.  
14 Nemr and Gangware, Weapons of Mass Distraction, 11. 
xxiv 
with a nuclear attack.15 Despite the story being quickly debunked, this perceived threat 
from Israel prompted the Pakistani defense minister to respond via Twitter to remind Israel 
that Pakistan was a nuclear state.16 Luckily, the incident was resolved quickly with swift 
corrective measures from the Israeli government and social media users who learned that 
the article was false.17  
Since 2016, fake news stories have become more pervasive and realistic, making it 
more difficult to distinguish between real, fabricated, or framed information. If a false 
narrative or deepfake video of the President of the United States making derogatory 
statements about another country or state-actor were to spread through the internet, perhaps 
reaching real political leaders or activist groups, the country could be driven to the brink 
of a nuclear conflict as with Pakistan and Israel. Are United States’ leaders prepared to 
defend its society and democracy from fake news-induced catastrophes? 
15 Russell Goldman, “Reading Fake News, Pakistani Minister Directs Nuclear Threat at Israel,” New 





I. DECEPTIVE MESSAGING IN THE UNITED STATES 
All war is based on deception. 
~Sun Tzu1 
 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research answers the following question: Which defensive strategies should 
the United States prioritize to mitigate the impact of deceptive messaging, and how can 
government leaders implement them? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The use of deception and propaganda is weaved throughout human history and war 
and can be traced back as far as the Neolithic age.2 Yet in recent years, these manipulative 
actions have become a renewed concern for national security efforts around the world 
because falsehoods now travel through cyber-based mediums, such as social media, in 
which they can exponentially reach more people in less time. In fact, a study in 2018 found 
that false news spreads further, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth.3  
Furthermore, deceptive information thrives in liberal democracies because it blends 
in with legitimate discourse under the protections of free speech.4 The quick delivery of 
                                                 
1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Greyhound Press, 2017), 4. 
2 Char Sample, Connie Justice, and Emily Darraj, “A Model for Evaluating Fake News” (paper 
presented at the CyCon U.S. 2018 Washington, DC, November 14–15, 2018), 1–2, 
https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/CyConUS18%20Conference%20Papers/
Session4-Paper1.pdf?ver=2018-11-13-160900-603. 
3 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” Science 
359, no. 6380 (March 9, 2018): 1147, http://www.sciencemag.org/lookup/doi/10.1126/science.aap9559. 
4 Renee DiResta et al., The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency (Scottsdale, AZ: New 
Foundation Organization, 2018), 99, https://disinformationreport.blob.core.windows.net/disinformation-
report/NewKnowledge-Disinformation-Report-Whitepaper.pdf; Insikt Group, Beyond Hybrid War: How 
China Exploits Social Media to Sway American Opinion (Somerville, MA: Recorded Future, 2019), 14, 
https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/. 
2 
information to the masses who are unable to differentiate between legitimate or deceptive 
information has reinvigorated the value and power of this age-old war tactic, which makes 
it a new world threat.  
The physical-world outcomes that manifest from cyber-based falsehoods are 
dangerous. Researchers have found that deceptive messaging campaigns have inflamed 
societal tensions, stimulated escalations to violence, affected economies and business, 
breached election security, misallocated resources during terror attacks or natural disasters, 
contributed to a rise in deadly but preventable diseases, and facilitated major geopolitical 
objectives.5 Since the government has an expectation to protect the public from such 
threats, each of these outcomes contributes to a gradual decay in the public’s trust in 
government and democratic institutions. Yuval Harari says, “underneath all the fake news, 
there are real facts and real suffering.”6 Anyone in the world with minimal effort and access 
to technology can anonymously inflict such outcomes on any community at any time, 
which makes the dangers of this threat even more concerning.  
Deceptive messaging campaigns are being weaponized all over the world for 
various objectives. The most notable cases of deceptive messaging campaigns with 
significant physical impacts include Russia’s use of “misdirection, misinformation, and 
propaganda” to facilitate the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the spread of false information 
that contributed to an anti-vaccination movement and subsequent measles outbreaks 
around the world, and the Russian influence operations that interfered with the 2016 U.S. 
presidential elections.7 More recent examples include efforts to “discredit the pro-
                                                 
5 Samantha M. Korta, “Fake News, Conspiracy Theories, and Lies: An Information Laundering Model 
for Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 1–10, http://hdl.handle.net/
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33, no. 4 (2017): 292–307, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2017.1377883. 
6 Yuval Harari, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (New York: Penguin Random House LLC, 2018), 
247. 
7 Veljovski, Taneski, and Dojchinovski, “The Danger of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ from a Sophisticated 
Adversary,” 304; Korta, “Fake News, Conspiracy Theories, and Lies,” 1; Robert S. Mueller, III, Report on 
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of Justice, 2019), 1, https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf. 
3 
democracy movement” in Hong Kong in 2019, and efforts to target major 2020 democratic 
elections.8 The global nature of the threat is not only targeting American’s but also 
American interests around the world.  
While many notable deceptive messaging campaigns can be attributed to Russian-
backed sources, this tactic can be employed by other nations to promote geopolitical 
objectives. Other nations known to use deceptive messaging tactics online include China, 
Iran, and North Korea.9 For example, in 2018, a cyber-security company found that 
Iranian-backed networks of “inauthentic news sites and social media accounts,” some 
posing as Americans, targeted worldwide audiences to promote Iranian political 
interests.10 The minimal cost and resources needed for disinformation campaigns online 
compared to traditional military tactics make it an attractive option for a nation to achieve 
its objectives. 
The low threshold of resources needed for a disinformation campaign also makes 
it an attractive tactic to non-state actors, domestic and abroad. Non-state actors may be 
motivated by ideology, political desires, monetary benefits, or notoriety. For example, alt-
right groups have spread “fake news stories, conspiracy theories, and memes virally on 
digital platforms” aimed at elections.11 Other non-state actors with less malicious 
intentions use deceptive messaging to exploit pay-per-click advertising online and 
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maximize clicks on ads that redirect users and ultimately generate profits.12 Regardless of 
motivation, non-state actors further complicate the information space with a large volume 
of false information.  
The rapid diffusion of deceptive content relies on a third group of actors who create 
or share it unintentionally. Unwitting internet users initiate and facilitate the spread of false 
narratives because they believe the information is either true or simply do not know if it is 
incorrect. In 1984, Yuri Bezmenov, a former PGU KGB informant, noted that Soviet active 
measures were so successful because “most if it [demoralization] is done by Americans 
doing it to other Americans.”13 With an estimated 3.9 billion internet users today, the threat 
of deceptive messaging extends beyond geographical regions and is not attributable to just 
foreign competitors.14 
Efforts in the United States to combat deceptive messaging are disproportionate to 
the extensive and growing threat. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) identified influence operations using social media as a significant threat to the 
country in the 2018 and 2019 World Wide Threat Assessment, and evidence suggests it is 
only growing.15 Yet, the Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee wrote in a 2019 
report that no agency or entity has been mandated to lead efforts to counter foreign 
influence, and as of May 2019, “the United States has no national strategy to counter 
                                                 
12 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Who Said What?: The Security Challenges of Modern 
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foreign influence.”16 Additionally, Nina Jankowicz, a Global Fellow at the Kennan 
Institute, pointed out that the dedication of resources to combat disinformation and malign 
influence are nominal.17 In a 2019 Congressional hearing, she stated, “The planned budget 
for RT [Russian international television network]... and certainly only a small part of the 
overall Russian disinformation ecosystem—is $277 million in 2020.”18 The Global 
Engagement Center (GEC), the designated agency to lead the U.S. government efforts to 
counter propaganda and disinformation, base budget request for FY19 was just $53 
million.19 The United States has not yet put forth adequate resources nor a national strategy 
to fight deceptive messaging and foreign influence.  
Although other U.S. government agencies have begun to dedicate resources to the 
deceptive messaging threat, no overarching and comprehensive strategy currently exists to 
bridge those response efforts. Elizabeth Bodine-Baron et al. emphasized, “Without 
cooperation and coordination, efforts will remain piecemeal and inadequate, and the United 
States will remain vulnerable to influence campaigns by Russia and other adversaries.”20 
A strongly coordinated response effort and strategy to unify government agencies, the 
private sector, and civil society could generate resources more proportional to the deceptive 
messaging threat. 
To improve the United States’ response to deceptive messaging, scholars and 
practitioners have developed a broad spectrum of strategies that the U.S. government could 
                                                 
16 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee, Homeland 
Security Advisory Council Countering Interim Report of the Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee 
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adopt to mitigate the threat. However, many of these strategies have yet to be implemented. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to compile and examine the plethora of 
recommended strategies, determine which of those are the most critical to implement, and 
identify how the nation’s leaders can begin executing them. This study primarily focuses 
on defensive measures to help close the vulnerabilities of U.S. society, rather than 
strategies that aim to target, censor, or counter influence audiences. Deceptive messaging 
cannot be solved, but the U.S. government can do much to mitigate it.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Rather than proposing additional prescriptions, this thesis aims to understand better 
the strategy recommendations that exist to mitigate deceptive messaging and how the U.S. 
government may be able to implement them. To address this topic, I collected a sample of 
170 deceptive messaging related recommendations from think tanks, academics and 
scholars, a security advocacy group, research institutes, private sector consulting 
companies, and government practitioners. The collection of prescriptions focused on 
defensive measures for U.S. society that aimed to protect the domestic population or U.S. 
interests, rather than offensive measures targeting other populations.  
To understand the collected sample best, I conducted a thematic analysis of the 
open-source prescriptions. Lorelli Nowell et al. argue that thematic analysis is a “useful 
method for examining the perspectives of different research participants, highlighting 
similarities and differences, and generating unanticipated insights.”21 The identification of 
commonalities and differences among experts will be valuable to help identify where U.S. 
government leaders can make the greatest impact and be most efficient in the development 
and implementation of response efforts.  
The method is divided in six steps. Nowell et al. defines those steps as: “(1) 
familiarizing yourself with your data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes, 
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(4) reviewing themes, (5) defining and naming themes, and (6) producing the report,”22 
Therefore, I first sorted the prescriptions into five themes. Sorting the prescriptions into 
apparent themes provides flexibility; however, it also means this task is relatively 
subjective, which may potentially lead to inconsistencies in the organization of the data 
when repeated by someone else.23 To account for this challenge, I coded the data that could 
be interpreted to support more than one theme with a secondary code when applicable. The 
secondary themes for prescriptions provided additional insight into how the themes could 
potentially be interpreted differently by other people.  
The five themes identified across the dataset were: (1) public resilience, (2) policy 
and regulation, (3) coordination, (4) research and development, and (5) operational 
activities. A statistical review of each theme revealed that public resilience and 
coordination related recommendations accounted for nearly half of all the 
recommendations in the sample. Due to time and resource limitations, the rest of the 
research in this thesis focused on further exploration of those two categories due to being 
overwhelmingly popular among experts.  
A detailed qualitative review of the public resilience and coordination themes 
revealed that coordination appeared to be a common sub-component for the prescriptions 
within the other themes. The recommendations within other themes used language, such as 
“partnership,” “collaborate,” “assist,” and “coordinate,” as descriptors. The centrality of 
coordination as a standalone theme and sub-component to other themes influenced the rest 
of this research to focus on identifying methods U.S. government leaders could use to 
implement organized coordination and engagement between relevant stakeholders through 
a case study and an assessment of a well-studied and well-practiced multi-sector 
coordination method used in the public sector.  
The case study examines and explains how coordination efforts play a role in the 
European Union’s (EU) response to disinformation. This method was chosen because 
                                                 
22 Nowell et al., 4.  
23 Nowell et al., 2.  
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responses to deceptive messaging are complex and so new that studies about them are 
limited to the minimal amounts of data available. Henry Harder states that explanatory case 
studies are useful for “investigating and explaining complex phenomena that may not lend 
themselves easily to quantitative research methodologies.”24 Despite not being able to 
quantify coordination efforts or determine their true effectiveness, the available qualitative 
data about the EU response is useful to understand the importance of coordination better 
and how it can be accomplished for deceptive messaging response efforts. It will also help 
identify potential strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s model and potential applicability 
for replication in the United States.  
The EU response to disinformation was selected as a case study based on three 
primary criteria: (1) experts hold the EU’s response in high regard as a leader in addressing 
deceptive messaging, (2) it is comprised of liberal democracies with many similar qualities 
to the United States, and (3) its response has been developing for over four years and thus 
provides more data points to evaluate.25 I collected data for the case study from reports 
and press releases published by EU institutions, reports from two different think tanks, and 
expert testimony from a U.S. Congressional hearing. Since deceptive messaging is an 
emerging issue, the EU presents an opportunity for other countries to consider mirroring 
its approach, or elements of it, as a possible option for securing their own populations. The 
single case study has limitations because fewer data points are available as opposed to a 
multi-case study nor does it explain a detailed methodology of how coordination can be 
achieved. Additional case studies were considered for this thesis; however, the availability 
of data and time restraints resulted in just a single case study.  
To account for the limitations of the EU case study, this thesis also provides an 
assessment of collective impact, a methodology for multi-sector coordination. This method 
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was primarily chosen for assessment because its framework aligns with many of the 
coordination needs identified by expert recommendations for a response to deceptive 
messaging in the United States. The assessment of this method first describes collective 
impact, and then examines its feasibility, benefits, use cases, limitations, and how it can be 
applied to the deceptive messaging problem. The combined use of thematic analysis, 
explanatory case study, and assessment of collective impact in this thesis offers multiple 
perspectives and options for the U.S. government to consider for improving government 
coordination in a meaningful way to mitigate deceptive messaging.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW: BARRIERS TO ADOPTION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter examines two themes within the literature that present a hindrance to 
deceptive messaging response efforts in the United States. The first theme is the lack of a 
common understanding of the complex, ambiguous, and evolving nature of the threat. 
Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo assert that the slow response from the U.S. 
government after Russian influence was detected was partly due to a lack of understanding 
the scope of the campaign.26 Additionally, Annina Claesson points out that the United 
States views the deceptive messaging threat “narrowly as the dissemination of ‘fake news’ 
by Russian trolls” in contrast to “a problem rooted in complex and rapid socioeconomic 
changes.”27 Although it is common for researchers to disagree on how to define 
phenomena, the way in which the deceptive messaging threat is defined or described 
throughout the literature is exceptionally scattered and detracts from solution- or action-
focused discussions.  
The research that aims to provide a better understanding of the threat uses a plethora 
of terminology and frameworks to describe it, which has created additional confusion in 
                                                 
26 Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, Policy Blueprint for Countering Authoritarian 
Interference in Democracies (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2018), 11, 
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/asd-policy-blueprint-countering-authoritarian-interference-democracies. 
27 Annina Claesson, “Coming Together to Fight Fake News: Lessons from the European Approach to 
Disinformation,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy, no. 17 (Spring 2019): 13–19, https://www.csis.org/
coming-together-fight-fake-news-lessons-european-approach-disinformation. 
10 
the discourse. Therefore, to help simplify the terminology used to describe the threat, I use 
the term deceptive messaging in this thesis as a comprehensive phrase to capture the types 
of information used throughout the literature to define the threat. Such terms include fake 
news, propaganda, disinformation, misinformation, and mal-information. 
The second theme is a lack of clearly defined responsibilities and leadership among 
the stakeholders that could or should play a role in responding to deceptive messaging. 
Supporting Elizabeth Bodine-Baron et al.’s argument for the need of coordination, Renee 
DiResta et al. asserts, “robust collaboration between government agencies, platforms, and 
private companies is key to combating this threat [influence operations].”28 Although a 
consensus exists for a multi-stakeholder approach, Christina Nemr and William Gangware 
point out that it is not quite clear which entity, the U.S. government or the private sector, 
is or should be organizing and leading such coordination.29 In fact, Alina Polyakova 
argues, “The greatest challenge facing the U.S. government as it has sought to craft a 
counter disinformation strategy has been identifying the appropriate coordinating body 
able to carry out a politically empowered policy agenda.”30 An examination of the 
literature about the roles of prominent key stakeholders, such as U.S. government agencies 
and private sector media companies, and the complexities of the threat will serve as a 
starting point to understand these challenges and provide some clarity to help facilitate the 
development and implementation of a response strategy. 
1. The Complex, Ambiguous, and Evolving Threat Picture 
Throughout the literature, it is evident that defining and describing the deceptive 
messaging threat and its components in a simplified and comprehensible way is no easy 
feat. Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan support Fly, Rosenberger, and Salvo and state, 
                                                 
28 DiResta et al., The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency, 101. 
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“the absence of definitional rigour” and the resulting “failure to recognize the diversity of 
mis- and dis-information” is a fundamental reason for slow progress in addressing the 
threat.31 After conducting a literature review, Joshua Tucker et al. echoed the same 
sentiment that a lack of consensus exists for defining “disinformation, misinformation, 
online propaganda, hyperpartisian news, fake news, clickbait, rumors, and conspiracy 
theories.”32 This challenge has resulted in a spectrum of interpretations of what the 
deceptive messaging threat constitutes. 
Experts’ interpretations of what comprises the deceptive messaging threat range 
from narrow and simple definitions to very broad and comprehensive. Soroush Vosoughi, 
Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral framed the problem in one study by only differentiating between 
authentic and false information.33 Whereas Nemr and Gangware have a more moderate 
frame of reference and define the problem as, “the purposeful dissemination of false 
information intended to mislead or harm,” while also recognizing that disinformation “can 
consist of true facts, pieced together to portray a distorted view of reality.”34 Expanding 
on more moderate definitions, Jennifer Kavanagh and Michael Rich describe the threat to 
democracy as a more extensive, and far less black or white, problem of “truth decay.”35 
They define the four trends of truth decay as “increasing disagreement about facts and 
analytical interpretations of facts and data, a blurring of the line between opinion and fact, 
increasing relative volume, and resulting influence, of opinion and personal experience 
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over fact, and declining trust in formerly respected sources of factual information.”36 Each 
definition is not necessarily incorrect; however, if each of these were applied to collect data 
in the information space, a significant contrast would likely appear, and perhaps 
disagreement, in the resulting data sets.  
Although scholarly definitions of the deceptive messaging threat vary in specifics, 
at a foundational level, they have more similarity and consensus. Nemr and Gangware point 
out three fundamental converging factors common throughout all the literature defining the 
deceptive messaging threat, “technology, media, and human behaviors.”37 Other authors 
have also attempted to simplify the complexities of the deceptive messaging threat with 
new terminology or frameworks that still effectively capture the nuances that may vary.  
Sam Korta uses the phrase “counterfeit narrative” throughout her research and 
argues, “more so than terms like “fake news” or “conspiracy theories,” counterfeit narrative 
more effectively captures the nuances of the disinformation, the actors disseminating it, 
and the spreadability of that propaganda online.”38 Korta, in parallel with Kirill 
Meleshevich and Bret Schafer, also proposed an information-laundering model based on 
money laundering concepts.39 These authors used the laundering models to illustrate how 
inauthentic content travels through the internet ecosystem to appear legitimate.40 Korta 
contends that her model “helps frame the issue in a way that homeland security 
professionals, law enforcement, policymakers, and the general public can understand.”41 
Similarly, Bodine-Baron et al. developed a framework called the Russian disinformation 
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chain to demonstrate each step in the disinformation campaign process visually.42 The 
authors assert that “by simplifying the framework to basic components we can illustrate 
where current proposed policies to address Russian influence are concentrated, and where 
gaps might exist.”43 Although these frameworks appear to be a step in the right direction, 
not all scholars agree on the effectiveness of models and frameworks used to describe the 
information environment. 
The information environment is a rapidly evolving element of the deceptive 
messaging threat, and Rand Waltzman takes a more skeptical stance and states that the 
information environment is evolving too fast for current models to remain relevant.44 
Although unconvinced about current models, Waltzman supports the development of a 
“Center for Cognitive Security” that can create and maintain information environment 
models.45 Despite widespread inconsistencies about framing, defining, and illustrating the 
deceptive messaging threat, scholars are more unified concerning other elements of the 
deceptive messaging threat.  
Many authors, in support of Waltzman, find that the architecture of the information 
environment and the evolution of technology present significant challenges to combating 
deceptive messaging. One challenge is the attribution of deceptive message sources and 
the ability for nefarious actors to operate with anonymity. Suzanne Spaulding, Devi Nair, 
and Arthur Nelson explain, “there exist few technical processes or solutions that can, with 
full certainty, determine the originating sources of online activity.”46 The difficulty of 
attribution, as Sophi Ignatidou points out, directly conflicts with guidelines for the U.S. 
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Department of Justice (USDOJ) to disclose information about foreign influence.47 These 
guidelines require a high-confidence attribution to a foreign government, which thus 
restricts its ability to act on the many unattributable campaigns or those of domestic 
origins.48 With the conflict between enforcement and attribution, Bradley Hanlon suggests 
that online platforms have more flexibility in terms of response since attribution is not 
necessary for them to take action against inauthentic behavior.49 Ignatidou takes a similar 
stance for the government and recommends that “EU and U.S. policymakers should not 
get fixated on specific agents as such an approach would be counterproductive.”50 In 
addition to identifying the actors behind deceptive messaging campaigns, the authors are 
also concerned about the visibility of future deceptive messaging campaigns.  
Building on the challenges of attribution, Renee Diresta, the Director of Research 
at New Knowledge, predicts that deceptive behavior online will become more difficult to 
identify with greater “misuse of less popular and less resourced social platforms, and an 
increase in the use of peer-to-peer messaging services,” to avoid detection from law 
enforcement.51 Such developments can possibly render the tracking or debunking of 
deceptive activity more difficult than it already is. On a similar note, Nemr and Gangware 
anticipate that encryption technology and artificial intelligence will also further complicate 
attribution or identification of deceptive messaging moving forward.52 In addition to new 
technology hampering attribution, Ignatidou points out, “‘datafication’ of different aspects 
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of life, the rise of smart homes and smart cities, the Internet of Things (IoT), accelerating 
artificial intelligence (AI) development, and internet and mobile phone penetration, have 
vastly exacerbated the combined ripple effects of disinformation’s complexity and 
scale.”53 The recognition of the challenges about the architecture of the information 
environment and rapidly evolving technology by leading scholarship are also well balanced 
with consideration for the preservation of democratic values.  
The concern among scholars for the protection of the First Amendment and privacy 
rights is high. Ashley Deeks, Sabrina McCubbin, and Cody Poplin point out that free 
speech has always relied on credible and natural regulators, such as experienced editors or 
producers, and those no longer exist with the advent of social media.54 Without those 
regulators in place, Fly, Rosenberger, and Salvo emphasize that response efforts must not 
inadvertently undermine democracy by violating such protections.55 The difficulty these 
authors have had to define and frame the problem combined with the need for practitioners 
to adapt to evolving technology while also balancing democratic values all contribute to 
the complexity and ambiguity of the deceptive messaging threat. 
2. Accountability and Leadership 
A general consensus is present in the literature that an effective response to combat 
deceptive messaging is going to require wide-ranging participation and cooperation from 
a blend of U.S. government agencies, private sector companies, researchers and academia, 
civil society, and the public.56 However, Clint Watts argues that the United States lacks 
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the leadership needed to defend the country from foreign influence.57 A divergence and 
lack of clarity exists in the literature when it comes to pinpointing which of those entities 
should lead and coordinate response efforts. James Farewell supports Watts’ argument by 
pointing out the ineffectiveness of the GEC, the U.S. government agency tasked with 
leading the federal government response to propaganda and disinformation.58 Farwell 
further asserts that the GEC will not be effective alone due to a lack of strategy and 
resources.59 Other scholars have responded to such claims about leadership by suggesting 
which entity would be best suited for overseeing and coordinating deceptive messaging 
response efforts.  
Nemr and Gangware point out the way in which deceptive messages are spread on 
internet platforms combined with their seemingly geopolitical objectives creates a conflict 
of accountability between the government and the private sector.60 Despite this conflict, 
Nemr and Gangware’s position is “social media and technology companies are well-placed 
to lead these efforts, in collaboration with governments and other partners.”61 However, 
others, such as Sijbren De Jong et al., argue that governments must be proactive to protect 
their citizens from the threat of deceptive messaging because “the principal task of liberal 
democratic governments is to protect the safety, security and wellbeing of its citizens, at 
the same time as it is to uphold and protect the democratic constitutional order.”62 This 
conflict is evident, as two dominant schools of thought are apparent in the literature, one 
                                                 
57 Clint Watts, Messing with the Enemy (New York: Harper, 2018), loc. 3203 of 4555, Kindle. 
58 James P. Farwell, “Countering Russian Meddling in U.S. Political Processes,” Parameters 48, no. 1 
(Spring 2018): 40, https://www.socom.mil/SovereignChallenge/Sovereign%20Challenge%20Publications/
Countering%20Russian%20Meddling%20in%20US%20Political%20Processes.pdf; John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232, U.S. Statutes at Large 132 
(2018): 2076–2078, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ232/PLAW-115publ232.pdf. 
59 Farwell, “Countering Russian Meddling in U.S. Political Processes,” 40. 
60 Nemr and Gangware, Weapons of Mass Distraction, 37–38. 
61 Nemr and Gangware, 37–38. 
62 Sijbren De Jong et al., Inside the Kremlin House of Mirrors: How Liberal Democracies Can 
Counter Russian Disinformation and Societal Interference (The Hague, Netherlands: The Hague Centre for 
Strategic Studies, 2017), 2, https://hcss.nl/report/inside-kremlin-house-mirrors-how-liberal-democracies-
can-counter-russian-disinformation-0. 
17 
in support for a private sector led approach with greater self-regulation, and the other 
advocating for a government agency led approach with more oversight and regulation.  
The push for self-regulation of private sector companies, primarily social media 
platforms, was palpable after the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. Gabriel Kahn, the 
Director of the Future of Journalism at the University of Southern California, was quoted 
in a December 2016 article, “Facebook and other platforms bear enormous responsibility 
here. A supermarket doesn’t stock fake milk on its shelves, so the largest distributor of 
news shouldn’t be complicit in pushing erroneous information with no filter.”63 Along the 
same lines, Jonathon Morgan, the CEO of New Knowledge and previous White House and 
State Department advisor, wrote an opinion piece in October 2017 titled “Facebook and 
Google need to own their role in spreading misinformation—and fix it.”64 He went on to 
argue, “every tech worker and executive has an ethical responsibility to protect our 
democratic ideals.”65 Mentions of the U.S. government in these pieces were largely non-
existent.  
Over time, authors began recognizing the inadequacy of self-regulation efforts. 
Bradley Hanlon, who supports self-regulation, began to publicly admit that social media 
company self-regulation efforts were insufficient due to a lack of coordination between 
companies, presence of inauthentic accounts, and inability for companies to “clearly state 
and consistently enforce their terms of service.”66 More recent publications still echo 
Hanlon’s unsatisfactory conclusions. The European External Action Service (EEAS) 
recognized that the efforts from social media companies have improved, however, even 
after the latest measures taken to combat disinformation during the Coronavirus pandemic 
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it claimed, “platforms have difficulties adhering to their own published standards and 
public commitments on preventing the proliferation of dangerous coronavirus-related 
disinformation, despite allocating significant resources to this task.”67 The inadequacies of 
private sector companies’ ability to effectively self-regulate are a prominent dispute in the 
discourse to a private sector-led approach. 
In addition to the less than favorable self-regulation efforts, Laura Rosenberger 
testified at a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing in 2018 and explained that 
large social media companies are just one piece of the information ecosystem and that the 
scope of the problem extends beyond giants like Twitter and Google.68 Echoing 
Rosenberger’s point, Bodine-Baron et al. explains that adversaries will “adapt to 
countermeasures, create or co-opt new willing proxies, or migrate to more-permissive 
platforms.”69 Further complicating the problem, multi-disciplinary experts from the United 
States, Canada, and Europe argue that disinformation is not just a technical problem, but 
“also a social and economic problem.”70 The less than favorable results from self-
regulation efforts, as well as unavoidable challenges of the information space produced 
discussions of a government-driven alternative.  
The government-led approach proposed by some authors would simply reinforce 
policies, laws, and coordination efforts, not replace them. Dipayan Ghosh and Ben Scott 
argue, “We cannot expect them [digital media platforms and companies] to regulate 
themselves. As a democratic society, we must intervene to steer the power and promise of 
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technology to benefit the many rather than the few.”71 In parallel, Alina Polyakova and 
Daniel Fried agree that social media companies should not “be the ‘arbiters of truth’” and 
suggest that the U.S. government, in conjunction with other nations, should reinforce and 
advocate for social media companies’ participation in building long-term resilience.72 The 
consensus for a government-led approach has grown in popularity in dominant literature. 
Despite some existing consensus for a government-led approach, the degree in 
which the U.S. government should be involved in response efforts is still debated. Although 
an advocate for targeted government regulation, Paul Barrett pushes for social media 
companies to do more proactive self-regulation to prevent government overreach.73 To 
support his argument, Barrett points out that too much government involvement could 
result in censorship and a violation of the First Amendment; however, companies 
moderating content on their platforms that violate policies is well within the law.74 Cass 
Sunstein presents a similar argument noting that the regulation of communication channels 
is inevitable; it is just a matter of what kind of regulation.75 Sunstein supports his argument 
by explaining how the media has been regulated over the past several decades with the 
issuance of licenses and creation of laws to protect property rights.76 Although more 
ambiguous, the desire and inevitability for government regulation that drives response 
efforts forward is apparent. 
                                                 
71 Dipayan Ghosh and Ben Scott, #DigitalDeceit: The Technologies behind Precision Propaganda on 
the Internet (Washington, DC: New America, 2018), 4, https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/
digital-deceit-final-v3.pdf. 
72 Daniel Fried and Alina Polyakova, Democratic Defense against Disinformation (Washington, DC: 
Atlantic Council, 2018), 10–14, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
Democratic_Defense_Against_Disinformation_FINAL.pdf. 
73 Paul Barrett, Tackling Domestic Disinformation: What the Social Media Companies Need to Do 
(New York City: NYU Stern, 2019), 22, https://issuu.com/nyusterncenterforbusinessandhumanri/docs/
nyu_domestic_disinformation_digital?e=31640827/68184927. 
74 Barrett, 20.  
75 Cass R. Sunstein, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2017), 178–182. 
76 Sunstein, 178–182. 
20 
In alignment with these conversations of government-driven response efforts to 
deceptive messaging, the Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee tasked DHS in 2019 
to become the leading entity to establish a national strategy to counter foreign influence 
and ensure effective coordination among the government, as well as social media 
companies.77 While commentary or analyses about these efforts has yet to be seen, the 
growing support among scholars for the government to take a leadership role and the 
documented tasking of DHS are a promising step toward resolving the gap in leadership 
and the development of a coordinated national strategy across all stakeholders.  
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II. THE U.S. RESPONSE STRATEGY PLAYBOOK 
This chapter expands on two categories of strategic recommendations common in 
the literature, public resilience and coordination. It outlines the main concepts within each 
category and compares them to the deceptive messaging response efforts in the United 
States. Chapter III follows with a case study of the EU’s response to disinformation and 
presents key takeaways and lessons for potential application in the United States. The EU 
case study contains valuable insights, but it does not provide explicit steps or methods to 
achieve a more unified approach. Therefore, Chapter IV introduces collective impact as a 
cross-sector coordination method and assesses it for suitability to address the deceptive 
messaging threat. Based on the findings from the case study and assessment, Chapter V 
concludes with recommendations to facilitate the development of a unified approach to 
combat the threat. 
Strategists have proposed an array of mitigation measures for the U.S. government 
to deploy to promote a society more resilient to the deceptive messaging campaigns that 
threaten the nation’s democracy. The broad spectrum of recommendations addresses 
improvements to many different elements of society from AI research to automate the 
detection of deception to U.S. government policy that governs transparency. While the 
sheer number of recommendations that have been put forth are seemingly overwhelming, 
they each play a critical role in a more comprehensive approach to addressing the deceptive 
messaging threat. In her earlier testimony before Congress, Alina Polyakova, an expert on 
the subject from the Brookings Institution, expressed that there is no “silver bullet” for the 
problem.78 With no one approach being the correct or only solution, the prioritization of 
such recommendations will be necessary as the U.S. government begins to mount a 
response.  
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To initiate the prioritization process, I categorized the sample of strategy proposals 
made by think tanks, academics and scholars, a security advocacy group, research 
institutes, private sector consulting companies, and government practitioners into themes. 
The strategy proposals analyzed were largely categorized into five major themes: (1) public 
resilience, (2) policy and regulation, (3) coordination, (4) research and development, and 
(5) operational activities. The identification of these themes can help streamline the 
creation of a framework for a comprehensive strategy for the U.S. government and simplify 
decision-makers’ understanding of their options. 
Out of the five themes identified, a majority of the recommendations primarily fell 
under two categories, (1) public resilience, and (2) coordination. An in-depth review of all 
five categories would have been much too large for this thesis. Therefore, this chapter 
highlights the significant recommendations and subcategories within those two themes and 
offers observations about U.S. government efforts in each domain. 
A. PUBLIC RESILIENCE 
Deceptive messaging campaigns seek to influence American audiences by 
exploiting human cognition and decision making through the manipulation and distortion 
of information.79 In other words, every individual in the world represents a potential point 
of vulnerability and the public’s resilience, or cognitive security, is a critical component to 
be addressed. Some experts believe that by fostering an informed and educated public, 
through a variety of means, society will be more resilient and less susceptible to malign 
influence operations.80 In fact, Spaulding, Nair, and Nelson argue that an “informed and 
engaged public” is the best defense against disinformation.81 The dominant literature 
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identified three leading approaches to building public resilience: government transparency, 
awareness campaigns, and media literacy initiatives.  
Although these approaches were popular among the collective, they do not 
represent all the potential ways in which the United States can better engage the public. 
Each approach can contribute to public resilience in different ways. For the purposes of 
this research, these subcategories are defined as the following. 
• Government transparency: The unsolicited disclosure of information 
about the deceptive messaging threat and the U.S. government response to 
the public.  
• Awareness campaigns: The medium in which publicly available 
information about deceptive messaging is disseminated and presented to 
stakeholders and/or society.  
• Media literacy initiatives: efforts to provide people of all demographics 
with the skills, as Alice Huguet et al. define, “to access, analyze, evaluate, 
and communicate messages in a wide variety of forms.”82  
Collectively, the three subcategories intend to create an environment in which individuals 
can make independent, informed, and educated decisions that are less susceptible to 
deceptive messages.  
1. Government Transparency 
Specific to the deceptive messaging threat, the U.S. government’s transparency 
practices are inadequate, especially when compared to international efforts. This research 
discovered just a few official reports from U.S. government institutions about the threat 
and response efforts, which have received minimal attention or were challenging to find. 
The information available is largely produced by think tanks and academics, not the U.S. 
government. It is worth noting that the U.S. government funded and sponsored some of the 
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reports published by think tanks and academics; however, the products typically do not 
reflect the views of the government.83 In contrast, EU institutions have regularly released 
dozens of press releases, reports, and updates to the public about the disinformation threat 
and their response since it began in 2015 (discussed further in Chapter III).84 The threat to 
national security and vulnerability of the population demands more adequate efforts to keep 
the public informed. 
Despite these shortcomings, it would be shortsighted not to point out some of the 
recent efforts of the U.S. government that reflect better transparency practices. One 
illustration is the decision of the USDOJ to release the Report on the Investigation into 
Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election in March 2019.85 Although heavily 
redacted, the report provides information that describes how Russia used deceptive tactics 
on social media to “sow discord in the U.S. political system.”86 Another example is the 
introduction of the Deepfake Reports Act (DRA) in July 2019. The DRA “directs the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to produce periodic reports on deepfakes to raise 
public awareness of possible fraudulent or misleading content, improve our understanding 
of the technology used to generate deepfakes, and identify how foreign governments or 
their proxies use the technology to harm national security.”87 These actions are a positive 
progression towards greater transparency. 
To improve the U.S. government transparency, experts proposed a variety of 
recommendations via communication and legislative measures. De Jong et al. presented a 
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more straightforward recommendation that “Governments should acknowledge what 
societal issues Russian information operations may (seek to) exploit and communicate with 
the general population the steps they intend to take, without becoming alarmist.”88 Other 
suggestions called for the introduction, passing, and enforcement of legislation that drives 
better transparency, which can often be a difficult and time-consuming process. Fly, 
Rosenberger, and Salvo argued, “Congress should help foster a culture of transparency...by 
passing legislation that ensures Americans know the sources of online political ads.”89 
Similarly, Robert Blackwill and Philip Gordon called for legislation to “enhance 
transparency requirements” in the context of campaign finance laws.90 Political ads and 
campaign finance related transparency would not be broad enough to expose the public to 
the dangers of deceptive messaging. Therefore, legislation to drive transparency of other 
stakeholders was also popularly suggested. 
Although this research is mostly concerned with the response of the U.S. 
government, the bulk of the other transparency recommendations revolved around social 
media platforms and private sector companies. To establish standards and accountability 
for private sector companies, Blackwill and Gordon recommend that the U.S. government 
should create a voluntary code of conduct, similar to the code that the EU implemented in 
2018.91 They continue to say that the standards should include monitoring their platforms 
for “disinformation, false news stories, botnets, and false-flag advertising—identifying, 
labeling, and blocking them where appropriate.”92 Legislation that targets social media 
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companies must be carefully considered as not all platforms are created equal and the 
encroachment on free speech and the open internet may be counterintuitive. 
These examples are just a few of the prescriptions experts made regarding U.S. 
government transparency practices. Better transparency efforts, however, is useless if it is 
not disseminated in a way for the public to find or understand easily. To build upon 
transparency efforts, other authors focused on recommendations that intend to raise the 
level of awareness of American society with publicly available information.  
2. Awareness Campaigns 
Awareness campaigns build on the concept of greater transparency, and can be used 
by U.S. government and non-governmental entities to help educate the public about the 
threat and response. Fly, Rosenberger, and Salvo proposed that the government entity that 
tracks influence operations should share the information with the public when possible.93 
Such campaigns could be strategic or tactical in nature. Timely awareness campaigns can 
help the public evaluate information they are consuming in real-time, whereas strategic 
campaigns will help both practitioners and the public understand the broader, long-term 
implications of deceptive messaging campaigns. Some authors, such as Martin Innes et al., 
find that real-time tactical awareness campaigns are critical to diminish the opportunity for 
rumors to develop.94 While both types of campaigns have value, an opportunity exists to 
make an impact now with real-time tracking projects that have been developed by civil 
society.  
The most notable examples of current awareness campaigns were created by non-
governmental entities, such as the Alliance for Securing Democracy’s (ASD) Hamilton 68 
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dashboard.95 Hamilton 68 was designed to “expose the effects of Russian online influence 
networks in real-time and to inform the public of themes and content being promoted to 
Americans by foreign powers.”96 In 2019, the ASD launched the second version of 
Hamilton 68 that expanded on the features and data from the first version.97 The public 
exposure of such activity provides just one resource for the public or even practitioners to 
use while evaluating information they consume.  
Some U.S. government agencies have begun to produce other awareness 
campaigns. One example is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Agency’s 
(CISA) one-page public document, titled The War on Pineapple (Appendix A), that 
illustrates how foreign interference operations are carried out in simple terms that can be 
understood by the average person.98 The DHS website recently posted a number of similar 
one-page products about foreign influence, as well as how to recognize, question, and 
investigate deceptive messages.99 These efforts are at a nascent stage and authors are 
seeking to expand them in their recommendations. 
To accomplish the expansion of awareness campaigns, experts highlight the 
benefits of the government supporting non-governmental efforts rather than duplicating 
them. Fried and Polyakova claim civil society groups are more capable than the 
government to identify deceptive activity in real-time, citing “Ukraine’s StopFake, 
Bellingcat, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, the Alliance for Security 
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Democracy’s Hamilton 68, EU DisinfoLab, and the Baltic Elves” as proven examples.100 
In support of their argument, Deeks, McCubbin and Poplin point out that funding and 
support of non-governmental efforts is a more sustainable path forward since the threat of 
deceptive messaging will be persistent.101 Support of existing awareness campaigns can 
be a force multiplier for the U.S. government to bolster its response efforts. 
Despite the benefits of the U.S. government funding non-governmental efforts, 
such a relationship can come with some potential risk. Polyakova and Fried push for the 
government and private sector to fund civil society efforts; however, they highlight that 
funding sources can create undue bias and undermine the public’s perceived integrity of 
the initiative.102 This concern is supported by dissent within the EU. The Dutch parliament 
has requested the European Commission to shut down EU vs Disinfo, a government funded 
project to track disinformation campaigns, with concern that it does not have the right to 
determine what is true or false.103 With the appropriate safeguards to prevent bias, civil 
society provides a tremendous opportunity for the United States to leverage in protecting 
its society through awareness campaigns. 
3. Media Literacy 
The internet has become a primary source of information and news for American 
society. Several authors highlighted that educational efforts for consuming and sharing 
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information in the current environment are necessary but deficient.104 Timothy McGeehan 
argued, “Western nations need to reinvigorate their civics and social studies programs as 
well as focus on ‘digital literacy’ to build citizens into “hard targets” for 
disinformation.”105 Singer and Brooking concurs and go as far to say, “information literacy 
is no longer merely an education issue but a national security imperative.”106 Huguet et al. 
supports McGeehan, Singer, and Brooking, and find that to be more effective, individuals 
need “the ability to evaluate sources, synthesize multiple accounts into coherent 
understanding of an issue, understand the context of communications, and responsibly 
create and share information.”107 Media literacy recommendations from experts go hand 
in hand with the themes identified in public resilience, which focus on education and skill 
development to consume information responsibly and become less susceptible to deceptive 
messaging. 
Despite the apparent importance of education and literacy to combat deceptive 
messaging, it is equally apparent that U.S. society lacks the skills needed to navigate the 
21st century information environment. Huguet et al. further remarks that it is not clear 
neither K-12 students nor adults are competent in such skills.108 To support their claim, 
Stanford researchers found that American students in middle school through college show 
“a dismaying inability...to reason about information they see on the Internet.”109 The 
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authors point to outdated curricula as a potential contributing factor to their findings.110 
Deceptive messages will continue to be effective if society does not have the education nor 
skills to differentiate between fact, falsehood, or opinion. 
Similarly to awareness campaigns, some of the educational gap has been filled in 
by non-governmental agencies, some of which partner with the government. One initiative 
considered a success is the Facebook Global Digital Challenge, which is sponsored by the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Department of State (DOS).111 The program 
was designed for students across the world to design and implement a social or digital 
initiative to combat hate and extremism, some of which included disinformation.112 
Although the initiatives’ website boasts to have served over 1,000 academic institutions, 
only a small fraction appear to fall within the United States.113 Despite these efforts, based 
on researchers findings, it is evident such skills need to be taught on a far more extensive 
scale. 
Some experts believe the U.S. government should be doing more to bolster 
educational efforts more broadly. De Jong et al. argue, “governments bear a special 
responsibility to instill media literacy courses in the secondary and tertiary school 
curriculum.”114 Other experts also pointed out that these education efforts should also 
incorporate government officials and journalists.115 To support De Jong et al.’s argument, 
some scholars point to Finland’s educational efforts and resiliency to Russian 
disinformation as an example to model after the Open Society Institute in 2018 gave 
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Finland the highest media literacy score out of 35 European countries.116 The study 
correlates Finland’s, and other Northwestern European nations’, resilience to deceptive 
messaging largely to their public educational systems and emphasis on media literacy, but 
mentions more research to confirm a relationship is needed.117 Marin Lessenski, 
Programme Director for European Policies at OSI-Sofia, states, “Finland’s government 
considers the strong public education system as a main tool to resist information warfare 
against the country.”118 Broader educational reforms, as seen in Finland, would be one 
way to scale media literacy efforts in the United States. 
To support the findings of the OSI-Sofia report, other research and anecdotes 
provide strong indications that media literacy has positive effects to help individuals detect 
deceptive messaging. Huguet et al. found that “Past research has identified some evidence 
that ML [media literacy] increases participant resiliency to disinformation and is able to 
change the way participants consume, create, and share information. However, there is 
little causal, evaluative research in the ML field that isolates the effects of ML 
interventions.”119 Anecdotal evidence is also available to help support these findings. 
Cambridge University’s online game that “works like a ‘vaccine’, increasing skepticism of 
fake news by giving people a ‘weak dose’ of the methods behind disinformation,” is a 
notable example.120 Early evidence from the game suggests it has been successful. One 
study claims, “the perceived reliability of fake news before playing the game had reduced 
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by an average of 21% after completing it.”121 The limited, yet positive, evidence available 
for media literacy initiatives offers some indication that broader educational efforts may 
be valuable in building individual resilience to deceptive messaging.  
Some steps have been taken to scale media literacy efforts in U.S. society. In July 
2019, Senator Amy Klobuchar introduced the Digital Citizenship and Media Literacy Act 
that “would create a grant program at the Department of Education to help develop digital 
and media literacy education across grades K-12.”122 Such educational initiatives are a 
positive step toward the recommendations that experts have made to provide American 
citizens with the skills necessary to consume and evaluate information effectively.  
B. COORDINATION 
Different stakeholders within the U.S. government, the private sector, and civil 
society have ramped up efforts since the 2016 U.S. presidential elections to combat 
deceptive messaging, often independently.123 Therefore, many of the strategy proposals 
found throughout the discourse focused on unifying and integrating stakeholders to create 
a more coordinated response. Within the U.S. government, two primary agencies have 
mounted response efforts to combat disinformation, the DHS and the GEC. This section 
first explores how these two agencies coordinate now to combat deceptive messaging and 
then identifies the dominant discussions and recommendations for better coordination 
within the literature. 
As of 2019, the GEC is the agency tasked with leading the U.S. government efforts 
to counter disinformation and propaganda.124 Despite critics arguing that the GEC is 
ineffective, its mission was expanded in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
year 2019 to “direct, lead, synchronize, integrate, and coordinate efforts of the Federal 
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Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-
state propaganda and disinformation efforts.”125 It is worth highlighting that the GEC is 
primarily focused outward on foreign entities and that domestic matters fall outside of its 
scope. Although the degree of coordination or integration with each stakeholder is not 
clear, the GEC claims to partner with the following government agencies: 
• U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
• U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) 
• Department of State (DOS) 
• Department of Justice (USDOJ) 
• Department of Defense (DOD) 
• National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
• Department of Treasury (DOT) 
• Small Business Administration (SBA)126  
The GEC also claims to consult with “allied governments, non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), and civil society, as well as with private-sector experts.”127 Despite 
the GEC claiming to have relationships with a broad array of stakeholders, the extent of 
these coordination efforts appear to be consultations and partnerships, rather than a joint or 
integrated effort, and seem to lack a guiding framework or strategy.  
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The DHS has also emerged as another leading agency to combat deceptive 
messaging. In an official report in May 2019, the HSAC formally recognized a gap in 
leadership and called upon the DHS to create “an inter-agency task force that would include 
all federal entities involved in countering the threat of FI [foreign influence]” and “play a 
leading role in raising public awareness efforts, ensuring effective coordination, and 
providing information sharing mechanisms to identify and help counteract foreign 
influence operations.”128 Although it is not clear how much progress has been made since 
the report was published, the DHS touts a Countering Foreign Influence Task Force 
(CFITF) that was established in 2018.129 In his earlier testimony before Congress, 
Matthew Masterson, a CISA Senior Cybersecurity Advisor, indicates that CFITF has 
largely played a support role to CISA operations but has plans to expand in 2020.130 The 
DHS CISA has taken significant strides to address foreign interference as part of the 
“Protect2020” campaign due to the threat it poses to election security.131 Through this 
campaign, they have worked closely with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial 
(FSLTT) agencies, election officials, private sector companies, and even published 
publicly available resources to engage the public.132 While both the GEC and DHS seem 
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to be pursuing some degree of multi-stakeholder coordination efforts, critics find that more 
work needs to be done.  
Throughout the literature, three overarching terms were used to describe the degree 
of coordination necessary to combat deceptive messaging: whole-of-society, whole-of-
government, and whole-of-nation.133 Although these terms seem to refer to a common goal 
of coordinating across a broad community of stakeholders, a clear definition of exactly 
which stakeholders each one includes or excludes is not readily apparent. Few authors took 
the time to define the scope of the phrase they used specifically when discussing the layers 
of coordination needed. Based on the information available, I outlined the specific 
stakeholder groups that should fall within each term.  
Out of the many authors who employed one of the three terms, this author identified 
just two that clearly defined their use of it in the context of combatting deceptive 
messaging. Waltzman defines whole-of-nation as “a coordinated effort between national 
government organizations, military, intelligence community, industry, media, research 
organizations, academia and citizen organized groups.”134 Waltzman’s definition is highly 
inclusive of entities within U.S. borders; however, it does not include international partners 
or allies. Despite this layer of coordination not being incorporated in his definition, he goes 
on to mention the need for cross-country coordination.135 Similarly, Suzanne Spaulding 
calls for a whole-of-nation campaign and describes it as, “a national approach that pulls 
together governments, at all levels in the United States and with like-minded nations 
around the globe, along with civil society, academia, technology companies, and the 
public.”136 The primary differences between Waltzman’s and Spaudling’s definitions were 
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that Waltzman omitted the public and international partners; however, he still discussed 
these two elements and incorporated them into his research.137  
Not all authors chose to use the term whole-of-nation in their research. Mark 
Warner argued, “we need not just a whole-of-government approach; we need a whole-of-
society cyber doctrine.”138 Without specifically defining what the difference is between 
whole-of-government and whole-of-society, he goes on to discuss the need for the 
government to work with international allies, the private sector, and the American 
public.139 His argument indicates that he views whole-of-society as a much more 
comprehensive form of coordination compared to whole-of-government. Fly, Rosenberger, 
and Salvo take a different approach and called for both a whole-of-government approach, 
focused on bridging all levels of government, and a whole-of-society approach, focused on 
the integration of civil society and the private sector.140 In both reports, whole-of-society 
was a more inclusive term than whole-of-government, and is better aligned with the needs 
identified in the strategy recommendations.  
After a comparison across the literature, the terms “whole-of-society” and “whole-
of-nation” seem to be largely synonymous and also include the most variety of relevant 
stakeholders. Understanding the different layers of coordination and types of stakeholders 
each term signifies will be critical to strategy development to ensure a crucial partner is not 
overlooked. For example, the HSAC used the term whole-of-society in its official report 
for the DHS that stated, “it is critical to develop a whole-of-society approach where 
government agencies have a meaningful liaison with the private sector, media, technology 
companies, academia, think tanks, and the general public.”141 Based on the use and 
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definitions of the three terms found within the literature, Table 1 visually compares and 
contrasts the stakeholders included within each of the three terms. 




Federal, state, and 
local government 
X X X 
Private Sector X   X 




X   X 
Academia X   X 
The Public X   X 
International 
Allies 
X   X 
 
Scholars and critics of government coordination efforts have translated the 
terminology used into more specific coordination models that describe what a multi-
stakeholder effort may look like and how it could operate. Deeks, McCubbin, and Poplin 
proposed using the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) from the Soviet era, as a 
potential interagency model that includes participants from the government, private sector, 
and academia.142 The AMWG was regarded as a successful interagency committee that 
                                                 
142 Deeks, McCubbin, and Poplin, “Addressing Russian Influence.” 
38 
comprised a range of experts from all levels of government.143 The AMWG “exposed 
some Soviet covert operations and raised the political cost of others by sensitizing foreign 
and domestic audiences to how they were being duped.”144 The AMWG was more closely 
aligned with a whole-of-government approach; however, an updated version of this model 
to incorporate other partners, as noted by Deeks, McCubbin, and Poplin, would be more 
aligned with a whole-of-nation or whole-of-society approach.145 Bodine-Baron et al. 
support their recommendation and expand on it by highlighting that the AMWG-like 
committee should be independent.146 The AMWG-like model was just one suggestion 
aimed at integrating stakeholders.  
However, not all scholars agree that an AMWG-like committee would be as 
successful today as it was in the 1980s. Schoen and Lamb argue that although the AMWG 
was successful, it would be difficult to duplicate.147 They support their argument by 
claiming that interagency missions are so broad and it would be challenging to find 
exceptional leaders who would protect the group mission versus the lead agency’s mission 
to achieve a similar result or effectiveness seen in the 1980s.148 Schoen and Lamb’s 
research, however, goes on to highlight the factors for success, challenges, and inner 
workings of U.S. government interagency groups.149 Such research will likely be valuable 
as other authors also explored other interagency solutions to the coordination challenge. 
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Fried and Polyakova recommended a fusion cell modeled after the NCTC along 
with an international “counter-disinformation coalition” as another possible approach.150 
The NCTC is a whole-of-government model that comprises employees from a wide variety 
of government organizations.151 Just like the current model, Fried and Polyakova suggest 
that a “‘national counter-disinformation center’ would include representatives from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
aforementioned DHS information coordination office, the Department of Defense, the 
GEC, and other relevant agencies.”152 In later research, they add that this center should 
have “a mandate for real-time liaison with foreign governments, social media companies, 
civil society, and other relevant actors.”153 The NCTC model is very similar to the 
AMWG-like model, which seeks to build a group of interagency participants. However, 
not all scholars agree that this approach will be successful.  
Farwell is skeptical of the NCTC model for similar reasons cited by Schoen and 
Lamb about the AMWG-like concept.154 Farwell argues, “the most challenging aspect of 
this approach involves relying exclusively on government expertise...information warfare 
requires a wide range of outside experts—many with unconventional skills.”155 Although 
skeptical of the NCTC suggestion, Farwell supports a team of teams concept because it 
“can capitalize on the strengths of all elements of national power to achieve its objectives 
and leverage the power of the presidency to maximize them.”156 Stanley McChrystal used 
the team of teams approach as a method to create highly effective teams that operate as a 
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network, rather than in a hierarchy or bureaucracy, to combat terrorist networks in Iraq.157 
While the AMWG, NCTC, and team of teams models all seek to achieve a highly integrated 
and effective team focused on combating deceptive messaging, the authors have made it 
clear that doing so will be challenging and that U.S. government leaders must put a lot of 
consideration into the creation of any task force or committee to ensure the group dynamics 
provide effective and positive results. 
The strategy recommendations made for coordination outlined ways in which the 
U.S. government can improve its efforts to fight deceptive messaging. However, 
integrating public-private sector entities, as Nathan Busch and Austen Givens explain, 
presents “significant implications for management practices, legal and ethical challenges, 
transparency, building private sector participation, politics, budgeting, and long-term 
planning;” it is no easy feat.158 In support of Busch and Givens, Bodine-Baron et al. also 
point out that private sector companies will likely be reluctant to cooperate with the 
government, “especially in terms of sharing proprietary data, private data, or both.”159 
Speaking from professional experience; however, some private sector agencies are 
motivated to share information as it pertains to public safety and national security with 
government agencies once trust and a clearly defined process can be established. Due to 
the challenges of such broad integration, as well as the apparent importance of 
comprehensive coordination as a foundation for almost every aspect of combating 
deceptive messaging, the following chapters focus on how the U.S. government can start 
coordinating more effectively with different groups of stakeholders. 
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III. GOVERNMENT COORDINATION IN PRACTICE 
Without a guiding strategy or framework, the U.S. government appears not to have 
a clear path forward for building the level of coordination that experts call for; therefore, it 
is worth leveraging information garnered from existing practices. The EU’s fight against 
disinformation is just one case from which the United States can learn. In her earlier 
testimony before Congress, Polyakova stated, “The United States has fallen behind Europe 
in both conceptualizing the nature of the challenges and operationalizing concrete steps to 
counter and build resilience against disinformation.”160  
European democracies have been the targets of foreign influence and deceptive 
messaging operations and threats longer than the United States. They therefore had more 
time to develop a more practical knowledge to respond to them.161 The EU began a 
multilateral, joint response to fight disinformation in 2015 that supports and coordinates 
across member states.162 It has been incrementally building and evolving the response ever 
since.163 Additionally, the United States is an EU ally and shares similar democratic 
values, which makes the sharing and application of smart practices less complicated. U.S. 
government leaders could leverage the EU’s knowledge about its mistakes, challenges, and 
successes specific to coordination in its response to disinformation to accelerate the 
development of a whole-of-society approach in America. 
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A. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S JOINT AND COORDINATED ACTION 
AGAINST DISINFORMATION 
Government leadership in the EU consistently promoted the importance of 
coordination for its response to disinformation, which made it a central component of the 
EU’s response. The European Council called for an action plan “with specific proposals 
for a coordinated response to the challenge of disinformation, including appropriate 
mandates and sufficient resources.”164 The top-down messaging was powerful and 
provided agencies with the latitude to use necessary resources for coordination measures 
that frame the response, which are highlighted as follows. Nevertheless, coordination is 
just a small piece of a more robust response from the EU. 
This robust response has been captured in several publicly available documents and 
progress reports that detail the EU’s approach to disinformation since 2015. Although not 
an exhaustive list of actions, the primary documents that frame the EU’s response are the 
following: 
• Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats, April 2016165 
• Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: A European 
Approach, April 2018166 
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• Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the 
Communication “Tackling Online Disinformation: A European 
Approach,” December 2018167 
• EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, September 2018168 
• Code of Practice monthly reports, January 2019 and ongoing169 
• Action Plan against Disinformation, December 2018170 
• Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan Against 
Disinformation, June 2019171 
Each of these reports illustrates the evolution of the EU’s response over the past 
several years, and complements one another. The full timeline of the response can be traced 
back to a European Council meeting in March 2015, in which it concluded that the 
establishment of a communication team was the first step to challenge Russia’s 
disinformation campaigns.172 That communication team is known as the East StratCom 
Task Force, which is discussed in further detail in the following sections.173 The Joint 
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Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats, a broad initiative to reinvent the EU’s response 
to emerging security threats, expands on strategic communication improvements to fight 
disinformation.174 The joint framework also calls for the East StratCom Task Force to 
improve its capabilities by incorporating “linguists fluent in non-EU languages and social 
media specialists.”175  
Expanding its approach to disinformation in the Communication on Tackling 
Online Disinformation, the EU defines the threat and “outlines the key overarching 
principles and objectives which should guide actions to raise public awareness about 
disinformation and tackle the phenomenon effectively.”176 The report organizes objectives 
under the following overarching principles: transparency of online platforms, 
strengthening fact-checking, fostering accountability, harnessing new technologies, 
securing elections, “fostering education and media literacy, supporting quality journalism, 
and countering disinformation through strategic communication.”177 This report also lays 
the foundation for the development of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation and the 
Action Plan against Disinformation, which build on the initial concepts in the 
Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation.178 Figure 1 illustrates this evolution 
and iteration of the EU’s response to disinformation across a timeline.  
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Figure 1. Overview of EU Joint and Coordinated Action against 
Disinformation.179 
In the early years of the response, the East StratCom Task Force was one of the first 
steps towards coordination that EU institutions took to respond to disinformation.180 The 
task force itself is an effort of coordination because it comprises 16 positions filled by EU 
institutions or member states.181 Additionally, it, “leads a myth-busting network that 
comprises over 400 experts, journalists, officials, NGOs and think tanks operating in more 
than 30 countries,” and “works closely with the EU institutions, EU Delegations, Member 
States, and a wide range of other partners, both governmental and non-governmental, 
within the EU, in the Eastern Neighbourhood, and beyond.”182 The purpose of the task 
force’s extensive collaboration is to “share best practices in strategic communications and 
access to objective information, and to ensure support for independent media in the 
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region.”183 In 2018, the Foreign Affairs Council commended the East StratCom Task 
Force for its efforts in strengthening the resilience of the EU and its neighbors against 
Russian threats.184 The East StratCom Task Force is just one of many other coordination 
efforts in the EU response to disinformation. 
To enhance coordination with the private sector, the European Commission 
published the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation in September 2018.185 The code 
establishes strategic relationships with the private sector, particularly online platforms and 
advertising companies, through a voluntary agreement that allows for indirect government 
regulation.186 The purpose of it is “to identify the actions that Signatories could put in 
place in order to address the challenges related to ‘Disinformation’”187 Signatories include 
Twitter, Google, Facebook, Mozilla, and advertisers and advertising industry.188 This 
agreement first institutes a common definition of disinformation that aligns with the rest of 
the EU’s response efforts and sets commitments for the signatories surrounding the 
scrutiny of ad placements, political advertising and issue-based advertising, integrity of 
services, empowering consumers, empowering the research community, and measuring 
and monitoring the code’s effectiveness.189 The code even goes as far as identifying best 
practices that signatories can apply to achieve their commitments.190 To assess these 
commitments, signatories are required to submit monthly progress reports for the European 
Commission to conduct targeted monitoring of progress and compliance.191 Iva Plasilova 
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et al. assessed the Code of Practice in 2020 and determined that there is still room for 
improvement on items, such as enforcement, but concluded, “the Code should not be 
abandoned” because it “has established a common framework” and “has produced positive 
results.”192 In addition to task forces and formal agreements, the EU has also achieved 
better coordination through other activities, such as information-sharing initiatives. 
The Rapid Alert System, a digital platform for information sharing, also resulted in 
better coordination among stakeholders.193 The platform connects 28 government 
coordinators of EU institutions or member states who can share instances of disinformation 
campaigns, analysis, trends, reports, and best practices in real-time.194 The dedicated 
mechanism for information sharing has increased the interactions and coordination among 
EU institutions, member states, national authorities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the Group of Seven (G7), and online platforms since its implementation in March 
2019.195 Regardless of the system’s success, it has already paid dividends in building 
relationships between disinformation experts in the region that can outlive the system. Such 
relationship building can take time, and the interactions resulting from the system represent 
a significant milestone in forward progress toward that end. 
Although the EU has made progress with the three highlighted initiatives, its 
coordination efforts are not perfect, and it has struggled with scaling its response and 
obtaining an acceptable level of private-sector participation. The EU has publicly 
addressed these challenges and developed solutions to resolve them. In 2017, De Jong et 
al. pointed out that the East StratCom Task Force activities were small compared with the 
propaganda produced by Russia, and cited the lack of budget and staffing as part of the 
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challenge.196 Since then, the EU has made strides to increase the scale of the task force’s 
efforts by stating that the budget supporting the task force, among other groups, is expected 
to more than double “from €1.9 million in 2018 to €5 million in 2019.”197 In addition to 
budget challenges, the signatories of the Code of Practice have been slow to include 
valuable details in their monthly progress reports about disinformation on their 
platforms.198 As a result, the commission has publicly urged them to step up their efforts 
on multiple occasions.199 The signatories have since agreed to “improve the transparency, 
accountability and trustworthiness of their services.”200 These illustrations are two 
examples of how the EU has worked to improve its weaknesses and mature its response. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s approach to coordination offer key lessons and 
best practices that can be applied to U.S. efforts to mitigate deceptive messaging.  
B. LESSONS LEARNED AND SMART PRACTICES 
The EU’s response to disinformation has demonstrated many invaluable lessons 
with regard to coordination for the United States. The East StratCom Task Force, the EU 
Code of Practice on Disinformation, and the Rapid Alert System all present ideas in which 
the United States can use to coordinate across government, the private sector, international 
allies and institutions, academia, and civil society better to combat deceptive messaging. 
Besides key takeaways from those three examples, the United States should also consider 
other elements of the EU’s response that may also facilitate effective coordination and 
other strategic goals. Other considerations for application in the United States include the 
top-down driven strategy development, the availability and accessibility of information, 
and the emphasis on citizen engagement.  
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The support and leadership of European Commission and European Council 
throughout the development of the EU’s response to disinformation was beneficial in many 
ways.201 First, it meant that the actions taken by EU institutions, such as the creation of 
the East StratCom Task Force, were supported and encouraged by top government 
leadership. Such support is important for obtaining resources needed to develop and 
execute coordination efforts. Second, political leaders could hold government institutions 
and other stakeholders accountable to the quality of their work and the tempo of 
development. The use of hard deadlines was prevalent throughout the material. For 
example, the European Council invited the High Representative and the Commission to 
present “an action plan by December 2018.”202 Third, political leaders could broadly 
communicate such initiatives and have greater influence over other relevant stakeholders 
within and outside the government, which helps to garner more participation and 
cooperation in the response. In addition to the overall development of the plan, the 
commission also recognized the need for public awareness and access to information.203 
The availability of official reports and an emphasis on public engagement 
throughout the EU response to disinformation have been praiseworthy and may be valuable 
for facilitating coordination efforts with the public and other stakeholders in the United 
States. Throughout this research, official reports from EU institutions about the response 
were often the top search results on search engines and were easily found. Whether or not 
the EU has something to do with the searchability of its information, it is important because 
if credible information about deceptive messaging or the government’s response efforts 
cannot be easily found, people may resort to sources of questionable credibility that are 
easier to find. Additionally, the information about the response is consistently updated on 
public websites and often includes dates for when the next update or report will be 
published. Once published, many of the reports were released in many different languages. 
For instance, the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats was published in at least 
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23 different languages.204 Although the United States does not comprise different 
countries with unique languages or dialects, as the EU does, the United States Census 
Bureau reported in 2015 that there are “at least 350 languages spoken in U.S. homes.”205 
If reports are published only in English, non-native speakers are precluded from access to 
the information and must rely on other sources that may be less credible. This emphasis on 
the importance of EU citizens was established in the first few sentences of the Action Plan 
against Disinformation, “European democracy is only as strong as the active participation 
of its citizens.”206 This fundamental mindset prompted many of the above public 
engagement measures throughout the response. The qualities of a top-down approach, 
information availability, and public engagement have presented more opportunities for 
coordination with stakeholders outside the government and the public.  
In contrast, the U.S. government should cautiously consider and evaluate some 
aspects of the EU response. One example is the heavy focus on Russian disinformation 
activity throughout the EU’s response.207 Since the EU recognizes that the “Russian 
Federation poses the greatest threat to the EU,” this emphasis on Russia seems 
appropriate.208 Russia also poses a significant threat to the United States; however, it may 
also be susceptible to harmful deceptive messaging from other nefarious actors other than 
Russia. The EU does briefly recognize other state, non-state, and domestic actors in the 
problem space; however, minimizing them in the United States could create weaknesses 
for a national-level response.209 The EU model will not have all the answers for the 
                                                 
204 “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council Joint Framework on 
Countering Hybrid Threats a European Union Response,” European Commission, 2016, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016JC0018. 
205 “Census Bureau Report at Least 350 Languages Spoken in U.S. Homes,” United States Census 
Bureau, November 3, 2015, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-185.html.  
206 European Commission, Joint Communication... Action Plan against Disinformation.  
207 European Commission, 2–5. 
208 European Commission, 4. 
209 European Commission, 3–4. 
51 
development of a United States response; however, the positives and negatives about it 
provide many insights. 
While the EU’s response model to disinformation may not be perfect, the United 
States can leverage both the positive and negative aspects of it to accelerate its coordination 
efforts at home. It should be noted that coordination is just a small piece of a more 
comprehensive approach in the EU, and more components may be worth examining 
further, such as public resilience and the policy and regulation measures discussed in 
Chapter II. Despite the value that the EU’s experience offers, the U.S. government will 
need to develop an implementation plan for coordination specific to its stakeholders. 
Therefore, Chapter IV presents collective impact as a tool that U.S. government leaders 
can use to build relationships with stakeholders across different sectors to address the 
deceptive messaging threat in a more unified and cohesive manner.  
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IV. COLLECTIVE IMPACT: A ROADMAP FOR 
COORDINATION 
The EU case study provides valuable insight into the role of coordination in its 
response to disinformation; however, it does not explicitly identify the steps that must be 
taken to build a disinformation task force or a connected network of stakeholders that have 
a wide variety of missions, budgets, goals, and expectations. As identified in Chapter II, 
the establishment of any organization to combat deceptive messaging in the United States 
must be done strategically and thoughtfully to foster effective and efficient relationships 
across stakeholders within and outside of the government. Such coordination is no easy 
task, and scholars are quick to point out the many failures of similar coordination attempts 
in U.S. history. Therefore, U.S. government leaders still need an implementation plan for 
adopting and executing any of the proposed coordination models.  
Since coordination across a broad range of stakeholders is not a new challenge, 
tools and frameworks, with proven success, are available that can facilitate the process. 
Collective impact is one method that has been used to facilitate the development of 
coordination between stakeholders across different sectors to solve complex problems that 
vary in magnitude and type.210 For example, collective impact brought together all the 
stakeholders that comprise the New York State (NYS) Juvenile Justice System in 2011 to 
address inefficiencies and failures.211 Despite each stakeholder having a different mission, 
scope, or budget, the sustained coordination through the collective impact method brought 
measurable success to a failing system.212 This case is explored in further detail later in 
this chapter. Additionally, when reviewed closely, the elements needed for collective 
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impact exist throughout the EU response to disinformation. Due to the positive examples 
and alignment with the needs for coordination, this chapter introduces and assesses 
collective impact as an option for building a whole-of-society response to deceptive 
messaging in American society.  
A. THE CONDITIONS OF IMPACT 
The level of coordination that exists across stakeholders combating deceptive 
messaging is a patchwork of ad hoc partnerships and collaborations that fall short. 
Collective impact is a more structured and comprehensive approach to coordination 
designed to bring together and align all relevant stakeholders around a centralized 
framework.213 John Kania and Mark Kramer define collective impact initiatives as, “long-
term commitments by a group of important actors from different sectors to a common 
agenda for solving a specific social problem. Their actions are supported by a shared 
measurement system, mutually reinforcing activities, and ongoing communication, and are 
staffed by an independent backbone organization.”214 By centralizing and focusing 
stakeholders’ efforts to combat deceptive messaging with a common agenda, the 
government can reduce the duplication of effort, maximize resources toward a desired 
outcome, and leverage special or unique skill sets.  
True alignment of stakeholders will rely on achieving all five conditions of 
collective impact: 
• common agenda 
• shared measurement 
• mutually reinforcing activities 
• continuous communication 
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• backbone support215  
The foundation of the framework starts with the common agenda, or guiding strategic plan 
and vision supported and reinforced by the other four conditions.216 Shared measurement 
establishes a method for benchmarking progress, mutually reinforcing activities ensures 
that action and efforts are methodical and organized, continuous communication to 
strengthen the relationships between stakeholders needed to make any of the other 
conditions successful, and backbone support provides administrative oversight of the entire 
operation to bolster the efforts of stakeholders.217 Each condition is highly interdependent, 
and if all five are not fulfilled, the chances for success are unlikely. The five conditions of 
collective impact are defined in more detail in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The Five Conditions of Collective Impact.218 
 
 
To fulfill each condition, a large volume of resources and tools are available to 
facilitate and improve collective impact initiatives. The five phases of collective impact is 
one resource available to provide a roadmap for practitioners combating deceptive 
messaging.219 These phases were identified and refined because of experience and 
research from practitioners actively engaged with collective impact initiatives.220 The five 
phases include:  
• generate ideas and host dialogues  
• initiate action 
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• organize for impact 
• begin implementation 
• sustain action and impact221  
The phases of collective impact are similar to the overarching timeline of a large project or 
business, starting with exploration and start-up that evolves into implementation, 
refinement, and sustainment.222 The five phases, seen in Figure 2, provide a roadmap for 
practitioners to identify where they are in the collective impact process and it also helps 
them understand what their next steps should be to fulfill the five conditions.  
Within each phase, key milestones or actions are organized across the four 
components of an initiative:  
• governance and infrastructure 
• strategic planning 
• community engagement 
• evaluation and improvement223  
Each component is focused on a specific goal that ultimately fulfills one or more conditions 
of collective impact. For example, the goal of governance and infrastructure is “to agree 
upon how your initiative is best designed and led.”224 The key milestones within 
governance and infrastructure result in the eventual development of a backbone 
organization.225 By using the phases of collective impact, practitioners can visualize the 
necessary steps to fulfill all five conditions, and stay organized and focused for maximum 
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efficiency. This resource can accelerate the development of a plan specific to deceptive 
messaging stakeholders by using lessons learned from previous initiatives to reduce 
inefficiencies or time spent troubleshooting challenges. The five phases, components of 
success, and key milestones are illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. The Phases of Collective Impact.226 
True alignment and agreement among stakeholders through all five conditions of 
collective impact, using the five phases as a guide, can amplify response efforts, and 
maximize the limited resources of each stakeholder to make it a worthwhile consideration 
to use in building a whole-of-society response to the deceptive messaging threat. For 
example, one collective impact initiative called Strive, which focuses on the success of 
children, “has a $1.5 million annual budget but is coordinating the efforts and increasing 
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the effectiveness of organizations with combined budgets of $7 billion.”227 Budget 
limitations are a constant constraint for the U.S. government, and aligning resources 
towards common objectives with other stakeholders to leverage the resources of many is a 
creative step to bypass such challenges and develop a more lean operation.  
Despite research showing that the collective impact model has “undoubtedly 
contributed to changes,” it has some potential limitations.228 In parallel with earlier 
discussions about the limitations of an AMWG-like model, Thaddeus Ferber and Erin 
White point out that government decision makers typically operate in such a way that 
results in “loyalty to a specific issue and funding stream,” which is counterproductive to 
the collective impact method.229 Joao Gomes, Marco Grotteria, and Jessica Wachter, echo 
this sentiment and state that the government needs a cultural shift “towards a focus on the 
bigger picture and overall impact of programs, rather than looking to short-term 
achievements as metrics of success.”230 The narrow focus and siloed culture of 
government was cited as a primary weakness of the intelligence community before the 9/11 
terrorist attacks.231 The priorities of each agency must be aligned with the broader group 
of stakeholders and the shared agenda to benefit the overall response rather than just one 
agency.  
In addition to government culture, other potential limitations of collective impact 
include the amount of time it could take to see measurable results and the ability for 
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initiatives to endure changes in leadership. The NYS Juvenile Justice System saw results 
in just two years; however, one study of eight initiatives found that it could take anywhere 
from four to 24 years to see results.232 These limitations of collective impact can, however, 
be mitigated through a variety of means. 
Entire communities and consulting businesses are dedicated to support and improve 
collective impact initiatives.233 Ferber and White conducted extensive research on creating 
successful collective impact initiatives within the government and identified a number of 
approaches and ideas to mitigate potential challenges.234 Some of their suggestions 
included culture changes, such as, “creating interagency structures focused on populations 
and issues, flipping accountability from ‘services provided’ to ‘outcomes achieved’, and 
changing government auditing and accounting practices.”235 In addition to those three 
suggestions, Ferber and White also identified public policies across all five conditions that 
incentivize and encourage a collective impact in government. Some of the policies include 
funding, the development of requirements for funding and collaboration, and data-sharing 
agreements.236 Without incentives driving the fulfillment of the conditions, participation 
in the initiative may not be strong or sustainable and competing priorities may detract the 
attention of stakeholders. All the suggested public policies to drive or incentivize collective 
impact for each condition are shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Public Policies that Encourage Collective Impact.237 
 
 
In addition to their findings, Lynn et al.’s research identified a list of best practices 
that practitioners can incorporate in their initiatives for positive outcomes.238 The 
principles focus on stakeholder equity and diversity, improvement, leadership, 
relationships, and adaptability. The eight principles of practice are:  
• Design and implement the initiative with priority on equity 
• Include community members in the collaborative 
• Recruit and co-create with cross-sector partners 
• Use data to continuously learn, adapt, and improve 
• Cultivate leaders with unique system leadership skills 
• Focus on program and system strategies 
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• Build a culture that fosters relationships, trust, and respect, across 
participants 
• Customize for local context239 
The eight principles of practice in addition to the cultural and policy changes 
identified by Ferber and White can help practitioners mitigate any challenges they 
encounter during the collective impact process and drive engagement of stakeholders. 
Despite the complexities and potential limitations of the process to create a 
collective impact initiative, practitioners can leverage the abundance of resources and tools 
available to create and maintain a successful initiative. This research only highlighted a 
few of the many resources and tools available for collective impact initiatives. The 
components of collective impact are designed to address some of the weaknesses identified 
throughout the literature for deceptive messaging response efforts and highlights what 
those efforts should look like moving forward for a whole-of-society response. While in 
theory collective impact seems to serve the recommendations from experts identified 
earlier, the following section assesses if the collective impact method is suitable for the 
U.S. government to use for building a coordinated response to combat deceptive 
messaging.  
B. ASSESSMENT FOR APPLICABILITY 
To determine first if collective impact is appropriate for the U.S. government to 
adopt, practitioners can start an assessment by using the Collective Impact Feasibility 
Framework. The framework was first presented by FSG, a consulting firm that uses its 
expertise to help clients around the world create social impact.240 The framework is a guide 
that consists of four yes or no questions to discuss about a chosen social problem, such as 
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deceptive messaging.241 Based on each answer, it signals if collective impact is an 
appropriate fit for the identified problem and also offers several considerations for the user, 
even if the answer is no.242 Admas Kanyagia recommends that a diverse group of 
stakeholders should “use data, stakeholder perspectives, system maps, and other tools to 
help local stakeholders assess each question” and “communicate the results of your 
assessment to the wider community when possible to rally support for future 
initiatives.”243 The feasibility framework facilitates the necessary conversation across 
stakeholders to determine enough interest and support for a joint effort to address the 
identified issue.  
The stakeholders that have a role in responding to deceptive messaging, such as U.S. 
government agencies, private sector companies, civil-society, and academia, are best suited 
to answer the questions presented in the feasibility framework together. However, based on 
this research, question two, “are there multiple actors in the system who can influence this 
social problem?” and the questions under number three, “is the system fragmented, 
disconnected, and broken?,, “If yes, do multiple sectors need to work together to address the 
issue?,” and “Are the majority of people in the system affected by this social problem?” all 
seem to signal that collective impact is an appropriate method to pursue for a coordinated 
response to deceptive messaging. The full framework is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Collective Impact Feasibility Framework.244 
In addition to the Collective Impact Feasibility Framework, it is also worthwhile to 
examine collective impact use cases. The NYS Juvenile Justice System’s effort to reform 
its operations is one example of a successful initiative.245 The system had a number of 
identified inefficiencies, it was labeled as ineffective, and it was deemed to be unsafe.246 
Most notably, “over 60% of youth were rearrested within two years of release” and “state 
facilities were under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice for brutal conditions 
of confinement.”247 These issues presented an urgent demand for broad social change. The 
NYS Juvenile Justice System is complex and consists of “public and private agencies, 
nonprofit organizations, and courts, with unique policies and procedures at both the state 
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and local levels” that also connect with other education and mental health systems.248 Due 
to the wide variety of stakeholders involved in the system and the need for drastic 
improvements, stakeholder leaders agreed that collective action was necessary for the 
needed reforms and collective impact provided a potential framework to drive that 
change.249  
The initiative started with a strategic plan, Safe Communities, Successful Youth: A 
Shared Vision for the New York State Juvenile Justice System that set a common ground 
for the stakeholders that comprise the system.250 The plan consisted of the following 
components: 
• Steering committee: A group composed of key leaders from the many 
entities across the state that comprise the justice system. 
• Shared vision: The agreed upon vision statement was, “Across New York 
State, the juvenile justice system promotes youth success and ensures 
public safety.”251 
• Two work groups: The groups were tasked to identify existing services 
for youth and examine current data. 
• Action steps: The actions steps consisted of 10 critical steps organized in 
three themes: “(1) assuring quality system governance, accountability, and 
coordination, (2) implementing an effective continuum of services based 
on best practices, and (3) collecting and sharing data to make information-
driven decisions and policy.”252 
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• Strategic planning action committee (SPAC): This committee consisted 
of “leaders from various agencies, organizations, and courts from across 
the state,” to ensure effective implementation of the strategic plan. 
• Backbone staff: State-provided staff to support the committee funded by 
three different state agencies.253 
Two years after the SPAC first met, it reported, “nearly all of the 10 critical near-
term action steps had been accomplished or were in progress, ensuring significant gains in 
governance, accountability, and coordination.”254 An evaluation of the initiative showed 
measurable success in several parts of the system. Two of the most significant outcomes 
were that juvenile arrests dropped by nearly a quarter within three years, and approximately 
half as many youths were in state custody.255 Stakeholders and evaluators highlighted the 
accomplishments made across the system in addition to other ancillary benefits:  
• New and stronger relationships across the system 
• Deeper knowledge of programs and services 
• Significant policy changes 
• Commitment to data-driven decision-making 
• Engagement of local communities 
• Empowerment of new stakeholders 
• Exponential leverage of the original investment256  
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Similar to the Strive initiative, the NYS Juvenile Justice System had an initial investment 
of just $140,000, but found that the combined resources of engaged stakeholders presented 
them with resources six times greater than the initial investment. Without the resources of 
many, the impact of change would likely be less significant. Although the NYS Juvenile 
Justice System saw measurable success following the implementation of the initiative, it 
should be noted that causal evidence showing that the results were a direct outcome of 
collective impact is not immediately available.  
Despite the lack of causal evidence in the NYS Juvenile Justice System case, 
research has been done on other cases to support the effectiveness of collective impact 
initiatives. Not all collective impact initiatives appear to be as successful as that of the NYS 
Juvenile Justice System. A study of 25 other initiatives revealed that five of them “did not 
have documented, meaningful population changes.”257 Researchers pointed out that these 
initiatives may have not yet had enough time for population change; however, noted 
differences between the initiatives were seen with evidence of population change and those 
without.258 Some of the identified differences included challenges with the quality of 
communication efforts, obtaining agreement on a common agenda and work plans, 
measuring impacts, transition of staff or duties, competing initiatives, resource constraints, 
and political support.259 This research indicates that the outcomes of a collective impact 
initiative likely depend on the quality of implementation, as well as control of external 
factors.  
To envision what the elements of a collective impact initiative may look like for 
deceptive messaging, it is worthwhile to look at the EU’s response to disinformation 
through the lens of the five conditions of collective impact. Although collective impact was 
not necessarily the EU’s method for building coordination efforts, the discussion of its 
elements earlier in Chapter III embodies and illustrates some of the conditions of collective 
impact, including a common agenda and mutually reinforcing activities.  
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The European Commission’s Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: 
A European Approach represents the potential for a common agenda because it establishes 
a shared definition of disinformation and the threat it poses across the EU.260 Furthermore, 
it presents a vision of a “well-functioning, free, and pluralistic information ecosystem, 
based on high professional standards.”261 The commission’s Action Plan against 
Disinformation goes a step further in outlining specific action items for member states, EU 
institutions, and online platforms that contribute to the overarching response.262 While the 
EU’s shared plan seems like a step in the right direction, it is not clear how much input 
other stakeholders had in the development of each document, beyond the commission’s 28 
members representing each EU country. While perhaps not a perfect example, it is a very 
close representation to what a common agenda may look like for deceptive messaging. 
In addition to a common agenda, the Rapid Alert System represents a mutually 
reinforcing activity. The exchange of information between the 28 designated points of 
contact through the system can help reduce a duplication of effort and coordinate the 
activities of the others.263 For example, one agency may be strong at conducting trend 
analysis, and the other may be an expert in disinformation detection. Rather than both 
agencies spreading their capacity to do both trend analysis and disinformation detection, 
they can coordinate those actions. The coordination of those activities would allow each 
entity to focus more resources on its set of expertise. Those disparate efforts are equally 
important to the disinformation response and can be bridged in the Rapid Alert System. 
Connecting that information and reducing a duplication of effort could lead to additional 
insights for both entities or even support the efforts of another stakeholder in the system. 
The Rapid Alert System and the framing documents of the EU response to disinformation 
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are illustrations of only two conditions of collective impact. An initiative must attain all 
five conditions to be most effective.  
Collective impact initiatives and the supporting resources are specifically designed 
to address the challenges identified in earlier chapters by establishing a shared definition 
of the threat and end goal, leadership to organize and align stakeholders and monitor 
progress, building trust with the private sector, reducing budgetary limitations by pooling 
resources, and driving equity for mutually beneficial outcomes across stakeholders. 
Research has shown that initiatives that lacked these qualities did not show meaningful 
change, and the same results could apply to combating deceptive messaging in the United 
States should collective impact not be implemented.264 Based on the alignment with 
coordination needs, the expected outcome of the feasibility framework, the measurable 
success in many cases, and noticeable traces of elements in the EU response to 
disinformation, collective impact is a method that should be strongly considered for 
adoption among deceptive messaging and information environment stakeholders in the 
United States. 
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V. MOBILIZING FOR SYNERGY 
A house divided against itself cannot stand. 
~Abraham Lincoln265 
 
Deceptive messaging poses a significant threat to U.S. society and research 
suggests that nefarious actors will continue to exploit the information ecosystem and 
evolve the tactics they use to evade detection and to achieve their geo-political, monetary, 
or ideological objectives.266 A meta-analysis of expert recommendations to combat 
deceptive messaging revealed that the scale and complexity of the threat demands a joint 
effort across stakeholders in the government, private sector, civil society, academia, and 
the public to develop a national strategy to combat it. This thesis explored two potential 
ways the U.S. government could improve coordination efforts to fight deceptive messaging 
in America using the best practices identified in the EU’s response to disinformation and 
the adoption of the collective impact method. Both approaches can facilitate and accelerate 
the development of a whole-of-society driven national strategy to fight deceptive 
messaging in the United States.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Deceptive messaging is a global challenge that can manifest into real threats and 
security challenges for not only elections and government agencies but also for financial 
sectors, healthcare industries, businesses, organizations, or entire communities. Polyakova 
and Fried made it clear that, “State-sponsored disinformation campaigns are upping their 
game, and they won’t be limited to election cycles. Democracies are still playing catch-up 
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—the United States barely so.”267 The U.S. government must get serious about building 
coordination that extends beyond ad hoc partnerships and collaborations, with FSLTT 
agencies, the private sector, media companies, academia, civil society, international allies, 
and the public to build an effective national strategy to combat deceptive messaging.  
Malicious actors spreading deceptive messaging campaigns use the divisiveness of 
U.S. society to their advantage.268 Coordination should be made a priority, and seen as the 
first step toward a national strategy to ensure input from stakeholders with the knowledge, 
expertise, access to information, and skill sets needed to build an effective response. The 
conversations in this research about which multi-stakeholder model the U.S. government 
should adopt or the free flow of information between government and non-government 
stakeholders carries little weight without first establishing relationships, trust, buy-in, clear 
rules of engagement, equity in communication, mutually beneficial solutions, and a 
collective conversation with stakeholders to determine the best path forward for everyone. 
Collective impact is just one method that government practitioners can use to 
achieve the relationship and trust building process. The five conditions and the five phases 
of impact provide specific action items and a plan that focuses on dialogue, outreach, and 
building synergy around a common goal and operating picture.269 Collective impact is a 
well-studied model that has proven to make “meaningful changes” in response to complex 
social problems, such as the outcomes observed in the NYS Juvenile Justice System 
initiative.270 By strategically aligning stakeholders around a common goal and operating 
picture, the U.S. government can overcome government budget limitations by 
compounding available resources and manpower to mount a response more equal in size 
to the threat, as seen with the Strive initiative.271 The success of collective impact and 
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resources that provide a roadmap forward make it a valuable option to tackle the whole-of-
society coordination challenge to combat deceptive messaging in U.S. society.  
The U.S. government should also use collective impact as a plan to help overcome 
stakeholder participation challenges with private-sector companies, as identified by scholars 
and experienced by the EU.272 A precedent has been established for private sector companies 
to voluntarily share data with government agencies for other public safety initiatives. For 
example, when Google identifies a “threat to life or serious bodily harm” on its platforms, it 
reports the information to the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center to ensure that 
any necessary law enforcement intervention occurs.273 However, speaking as a participant, 
this process was the outcome of several months of dialogue and in-person conversations of 
personnel to build relationships and understand the perspectives and boundaries within which 
each party was operating. A voluntary agreement or U.S. code of practice, similar to the EU 
code, may be a good place to start to establish rules of engagement and document the needs, 
capabilities, and plans for stakeholders to contribute to a response.  
Developing any coordination or stakeholder relationship will be challenging 
without a person or entity driving and organizing those efforts. Congress should 
immediately identify and clarify which agency or entity will be mandated to lead deceptive 
messaging strategy and coordination development. With adequate funding, support, 
mandates, and messaging, the DHS may be a logical option to lead this endeavor since it 
has been mounting a foreign influence response with election security efforts and the 
CFITF. Furthermore, the Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee tasked the DHS in 
2019 to become the leading entity to establish a national strategy to counter foreign 
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influence and ensure effective coordination.274 Other benefits to considering the DHS for 
this role are apparent since it is well connected to and possesses existing practices, systems, 
and knowledge that may be leveraged and repurposed for combatting deceptive messaging 
in America. Two examples include the National Network of Fusion Centers and the 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). 
From my professional experience, fusion centers have been developing and refining 
information sharing and reporting networks since 2001 that connect FSLTT law enforcement, 
the intelligence community, public safety agencies, the public, faith-based communities, 
medical communities, and in many cases, the private sector. The established network can be a 
force multiplier to detect and report malicious deceptive messaging campaigns for tactical 
response or strategic reporting. Fusion centers’ daily operations and grant requirements rely 
heavily on using HSIN to communicate with partners and across the network.275  
The DHS created HSIN, a secure digital platform, to reduce a duplication of effort 
and facilitate information sharing and collaboration across the nation’s vast intelligence 
network.276 The system consists of over 110,000 tribal, territorial, state, local, federal, non-
profit, private sector, and international vetted users that can post projects for collaboration 
and share sensitive, unclassified information to thousands of other intelligence 
stakeholders in real-time.277 HSIN is similar to the Rapid Alert System in the EU’s 
response to disinformation, which successfully increased the interactions, trust, and 
communication between EU stakeholders.278 U.S. stakeholders can use the fusion center 
                                                 
274 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee, Homeland 
Security Advisory Council Countering Interim Report of the Countering Foreign Influence Subcommittee, 
10. 
275 Department of Homeland Security, 2018 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), B–1, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/2018_national_network_of_fusion_centers_final_report.pdf. 
276 Homeland Security Information Network, Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) FY 
2018 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 1–30, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hsin-fy2018-annual-report.pdf. 
277 Homeland Security Information Network, 4. 
278 European Commission, Joint Communication ...Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan 
against Disinformation; European Union External Action, Rapid Alert System Strengthening Coordinated 
and Joint Responses to Disinformation, 1. 
75 
network and HSIN to detect and share information about deceptive messaging campaigns 
and tactics in real-time, while improving relationships and coordination simultaneously.  
U.S. government practitioners should also leverage the many other best practices 
identified in the EU response to disinformation, such as creating a joint action plan or common 
agenda, providing support from the top tiers of the U.S. administration and government, setting 
hard deadlines for report publications, and making information available and accessible to the 
public and stakeholders. Practitioners, however, should not stop at identifying best practices 
from the EU and also seek more from other stakeholders, such as civil society disinformation 
tracking efforts, and other countries, such as Finland, which is held in high regard for its 
resilience to deceptive messaging campaigns and media literacy programs.279  
Developing a common agenda is the first condition of the collective impact process 
and the European Commission’s Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: A 
European Approach and the Action Plan against Disinformation provide concrete 
examples of what one can look like for a response to disinformation.280 The development 
of these two documents may have been challenging had it not been for the support of the 
top levels of EU governance. Support from the presidential administration and Congress 
will be helpful to address budget challenges, and enforce binding agreements or legislation 
and the publication of necessary reports.  
The availability and accessibility of information is critical for building public 
resilience, and the continuous use of deadlines throughout the EU response to 
disinformation established a degree of accountability and expectations that can be helpful 
to prevent the stagnation of progress. Whether or not deadlines directly contributed to the 
EU’s progress, its response has matured and grown much quicker than that of the United 
States.281 In addition to ensuring the availability of updated information, other government 
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stakeholders producing products and reports should follow the example set by the DHS 
CISA product, The War on Pineapple, because it is easy to find, consume, and recall. To 
expand on consumption principles, products should not only be concise and written in plain 
language, but they must also be published in more languages, than just English, to reach 
all demographics and communities within U.S. society.  
Awareness campaigns can also be used to help develop training and awareness 
efforts for government personnel and journalists. Although training resources are at a 
nascent stage, materials are available online to facilitate the development of a program. For 
example, RAND sponsors a webpage called “Tools That Fight Disinformation Online” that 
is a robust library of resources for education, training, detection, tracking, verification, and 
more.282 The trust in government and media is fragile, and personnel in those professions 
must set an example for resilience to disinformation to ensure the public is provided with 
true and accurate narratives to form their own opinions or beliefs. 
Training for personnel and stakeholders should also consist of building awareness 
about response efforts in the United States. As identified in this research, many government 
agencies, beyond the DHS and GEC, have ramped up efforts against foreign influence, 
disinformation, and information warfare. Having access to information about which 
stakeholders are performing certain actions will be critical to facilitate in the beginning 
phases of a collective impact initiative to truly align stakeholders, and this resource does 
not seem to currently exist. Table 4 compiles the government agencies that have been 
identified via open source as contributing some variation of effort to fight deceptive 
messaging. Due to a lack of time and resources, research on specific agencies was limited 
to only government stakeholders. However, it can and should be used as a starting place 
for others to expand and include other information, such as the role and focus of each 
agency to help other stakeholders prioritize objectives and align them with the broader 
collective. Table 4 is still being updated and thus is not final. U.S. government practitioners 
should pursue the expansion of this resource and make it, or parts of it, widely available to 
non-government agencies or even the public to increase transparency and trust.  
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Table 4. U.S. Government Agencies Fighting Deceptive Messaging. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)283 Department of Defense (DOD-EUCOM, USCYBERCOM, 
SOCOM, DARPA)284 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)285 National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC)286 
U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ)287 Department of Treasury (DOT)288 
Global Engagement Center (GEC)289 National Security Agency (NSA)290 
FBI—Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF)291 U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)292 
Russia Influence Group (RIG) (Co-chaired by DOS and 
DOD)293 
United States Agency for International Development 
 (USAID)294 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis aimed to progress the U.S. government’s response to deceptive 
messaging by identifying and simplifying policy prescriptions, determining which 
prescriptions should be a priority for a national strategy, and presenting methods and 
resources available to accomplish those priorities. Deceptive messaging is not a threat that 
can be eliminated, and it may take several years of committed effort before any measurable 
or meaningful results are observed. However, it is critical to look at the recommendations 
for a response in smaller units that can be prioritized and translated into specific action 
items that over time will contribute to long-term societal resilience.  
Deceptive messaging campaigns are only expected to become more pervasive and 
more difficult to detect, track, and attribute with the adversary adapting to countermeasures 
and policies, and the evolution of technology, such as deepfakes and encryption. In fact, 
other countries are experiencing the spread of disinformation through private platforms and 
closed groups or instant messengers, and the abilities of AI to generate counterfeit media 
are expected to surpass those of AI to identify such media by 2020.295 The lack of visibility 
or inability to identify deceptive messaging will make information sharing, collaboration, 
and public engagement even more important.  
Grave consequences may result if deceptive messaging response efforts remain 
independent or a loose patchwork. In fact, the siloed nature of the intelligence community 
was cited by the 9/11 Commission as a weakness leading up to the terrorist attacks.296 The 
United States should capitalize on the lessons learned about the value of joint action from 
The 9/11 Commission Report to strengthen its defenses against deceptive messaging before 
the next major attack. Once a deceptive messaging campaign has taken root in society, 
effectively counteracting that message or reversing its effects is advantageous. The U.S. 
government should be more proactive in creating a unified national strategy that starts with 
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a collective impact initiative as its foundation and uses best practices from the EU to 
accelerate those efforts. Should the U.S. government not take the necessary steps to bring 
together important parts of society to challenge those who wish to harm the U.S. via cyber-
based deceptive messaging, it may be on a path in which fake news-induced catastrophes 
are reality.  
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APPENDIX A. THE WAR ON PINEAPPLE 
 
Figure 4. The War on Pineapple and Understanding Foreign Interference.297 
                                                 
297 Source: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, The War on Pineapple, 1. 
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APPENDIX B. GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Cognitive Security: Focus on protection from the exploitation of cognitive biases 
and social influence of large public groups.298 
Deceptive Messaging: Comprehensive term that includes information defined as 
fake news, propaganda, disinformation, misinformation, and mal-information, 
communicated or shared intentionally or unintentionally to mislead the consumer. 
Deepfake: “An audiovisual record created or altered in a manner that the record 
would falsely appear to a reasonable observer to be an authentic record of the actual speech 
or conduct of an individual.”299 
Disinformation: “All forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information 
designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit.”300 
Fake News: “Hoax-based stories that perpetuate hearsay, rumors, and 
misinformation.”301 
Foreign Influence: “Malign actions taken by foreign governments or foreign 
actors designed to sow discord, manipulate public discourse, discredit the electoral system, 
bias the development of policy, or disrupt markets for the purpose of undermining the 
interests of the United States and its allies.”302 
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Hybrid Threats: Threats that “combine conventional and unconventional, military 
and non-military activities that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state 
actors to achieve specific political objectives.”303 
Information Environment: “The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and 
systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.”304 
Information Laundering: “The process through which the ‘internet’s unique 
properties allow subversive social movements to not only grow globally, but also to quietly 
legitimize their causes through a borrowed network of associations.’”305 
Mal-Information: “When genuine information is shared to cause harm.”306 
Media Literacy: “The ability to access, analyze, evaluate, and communicate 
messages in a wide variety of forms.”307 
Misinformation: “False or misleading information, whether or not the agent 
spreading the information intends to mislead”308 
Propaganda: “The deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist.”309 
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Whole-of-Society Approach: A joint and coordinated effort across a group of 
diverse stakeholders that includes, but may not be limited to, federal, state, and local 
government, the private sector, civil society and non-governmental organizations, 
academia, the public, and international allies.310 
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